Fiddling With the Constitution While Rome Burns: The Case Against the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by McClellan, Dr. James
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 42 | Number 1
Fall 1981
Fiddling With the Constitution While Rome
Burns: The Case Against the Voting Rights Act of
1965
Dr. James McClellan
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Dr. James McClellan, Fiddling With the Constitution While Rome Burns: The Case Against the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 La. L. Rev.
(1981)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol42/iss1/5
FIDDLING WITH THE CONSTITUTION WHILE
ROME BURNS: THE CASE AGAINST THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
Dr. James McClellan*
Like other small municipalities in the mountainous regions of
north Georgia, where the Blue Ridge and the Appalachian Trail
mark their timeless entry into the southern Piedmont, the City of
Rome is a predominantly white community. Flanked to the north by
"Mountain Republicans," Rome shares a common heritage with the
rural areas of east Tennessee, northeastern Alabama, the western
Carolinas, and southwestern Virginia that dates back to the War Be-
tween the States. In these areas, union sentiment ran the highest in
the old Confederacy, frustrating the secessionists and even the war
effort. Long before the war, the small upland farmers who populated
this region were a class apart from the lowland planters. They had
neither slaves nor plantations, and their politics traditionally have
reflected different interests and attitudes. Even today one senses an
attachment to the ancient Republican traditions. "They vote a
straight Republican ticket election after election. Nor are the moun-
taineers Republicans by choice; they are Republicans by inheritance."1
Because the Negro population of this area has never been sub-
stantial in number, the tiny hamlets and small towns dotting the
southern tip of the Blue Ridge historically have conducted their
political affairs in an atmosphere that is relatively free of racial
strife compared to the southern parts of the state, where the Negro
population of Georgia is concentrated. Many of the thinly populated
counties of north Georgia, for example, contain almost no Negroes.
According to the 1980 Census, Forsythe County contains only one
Negro; Fannin County has only seven; Gilmer, just twenty-two. Daw-
son County has none. Throughout the region, Negroes represent a
miniscule fraction of the total population.!
Rome, located in Floyd County on the fringe of the Mountain
Republican area, contains a percentage of Negroes slightly larger
than most of the counties to the north, but is otherwise represen-
* B.A., University of Alabama; Ph.D. University of Virginia; J.D., University of
Virginia. Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Separation of Powers Subcommittee,
United States Senate Judiciary Committee.
1. V. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS 280-81 (1949).
2. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION & HOUSING, FINAL P & H
UNIT Count, Series PHC 80-V (1980).
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tative of the area in that whites comprise the great bulk of the
population."
Thus situated, the City of Rome has experienced fewer racial
problems than most small cities of the Deep South. Though it did
not elude entirely the whirlwinds of Reconstruction politics,' Rome
seldom felt a conspicuous federal presence in its local affairs. And
when the initial flurry of federal laws generated by the civil rights
movement of the late 1950's and early 1960's fell on Georgia, Rome
was more of an observer than an intended recipient. While other
Georgia cities to the south, such as Albany and Atlanta, were em-
broiled in civil disturbances, Rome was seemingly untouched by
racial discord. Enjoying considerable local autonomy, Rome quietly
built a record of success in race relations beginning in the 1960's
largely on its own initiative.' But with the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Rome soon found itself caught up in the broad
sweep of federal electoral reform. Not since 1867, when General
John Pope established a military outpost in Rome,7 had the moun-
tain city experienced such direct federal intervention in the conduct
of its affairs.
Rome stoutly resisted the application of the Voting Rights Act
to its political affairs and eventually brought an action in 1977
against the United States for declaratory relief. Claiming exemption
from the statute on the ground that the City's various annexations
and voting changes over the course of a decade had neither the pur-
pose nor the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on the
3. In 1970, Rome had a population of 30,759, of whom 23,543, or 76.6% were
white and 7,216, or 23.4% were Negro. The voting age population in 1970 was 79.4%
white and 20.6% Negro. The actual number of registered voters in Rome closely
paralleled these percentages: as of 1975, Rome had 13,097 registered voters, of whom
83.9% were white and 15.5%/ were Negro. City of Rome'v. United States, 472 F. Supp.
221, 223 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). Justice Marshall's opinion for the
Court omits reference to the 1975 population data contained in both the district court's
opinion and in Brief for Appellants at 5. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156
(1980).
4. See A. CONWAY, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GEORGIA (1966); The Condition of Af-
fairs in Georgia: Statement of Hon. Nelson Tift to Reconstruction Committee of the
House of Representatives, Washington, February 18, 1869 (1971). Although all the
southern states had many common experiences under Reconstruction, those on whom
it bore the hardest had a large Negro population-South Carolina, Louisiana, and
Mississippi in particular.
5. See the district court's findings in 472 F. Supp. at 224-27.
6. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (1976). as amended by Act of June 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314
(1970) and Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975)).
7. A. CONWAY, supra note 4, at 142.
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basis of race, Rome argued that Attorney General Griffin Bell had
unconstitutionally applied the Act to the city. A three-judge District
Court for the District of Columbia rejected this argument, however,
holding that although Rome's electoral changes were enacted with-
out discriminatory purpose, they were nevertheless prohibited
under the Act because of their discriminatory effect." In City of
Rome v. United States,9 the Supreme Court affirmed the District
Court ruling. In response to the city's claim that the Voting Rights
Act exceeded Congress' enforcement power under the fifteenth
amendment, the Court reaffirmed its expansive view of the enforce-
ment power in South Carolina v. Katzenbach" and went on to write
a new chapter in the history of the fifteenth amendment. Under sec-
tion 2 of the amendment, the Court concluded, Congress' enforce-
ment powers are so broad as to include the right to prohibit prac-
tices that in and of themselves do not violate section 1, so long as
the prohibitions attacking discrimination are "appropriate."
City of Rome thus represents a bold new course of Constitu-
tional development under the Reconstruction Amendments. in that
Congress may now reach beyond the substantive provisions of the
amendments themselves to prohibit state action which, in Congress'
judgment, has an unintended but discriminatory impact. No less sig-
nificant or novel is the underlying political theory of democratic
representation implicit in the Court's decision, suggesting that the
fifteenth amendment not only guarantees freedom from racial dis-
crimination in the exercise of the franchise, but also creates a
minority right to hold office.
In response to City of Rome and the body of case law that has
been developed by the Supreme Court under the Voting Rights Act
since 1966, this article offers the thesis that the Act itself is an un-
constitutional exercise of legislative power under the fifteenth
amendment, and that City of Rome is contrary to the intentions of
those who framed both amendment and the Act. Examining this
decision and earlier cases in the light of Congressional hearings and
debates on the adoption and extension of the Voting Rights Act, the
article contends that the Court has interpreted the Act to include
political rights for minorities and restrictions on the states that run
counter to the expressed intent of those who participated in the for-
mulation of the Act. An accompanying analysis of the debates on the
framing and adoption of the fifteenth amendment further maintains
8. 472 F. Supp. at 245.
9. 446 U.S. at 187.
10. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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that the framers specifically considered and rejected the position
now supported by the Court that literacy tests and the right to hold
office fell within the purview of the amendment, it -being generally
agreed in 1869 that the states retained their power over these
aspects of the franchise.
Crucial to a proper interpretation of both the Act and the en-
forcement clause of the fifteenth amendment are the debates on
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, when the framers of the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments first attempted to analyze in depth their under-
standing of Congress' power to enforce these amendments "by ap-
propriate legislation." Though ignored by the Court, these important
debates shed considerable light on the intended scope and meaning
of the enforcement power. From an analysis of this legislative
history, the author concludes that the framers of the Reconstruction
Amendments did not intend to confer upon Congress all of the
power over political rights that is embodied in the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, and expressly favored a construction of the enforce-
ment power that was consistent with the principles of Federalism.
Finally, this article briefly examines the line of cases culminat-
ing in City of Rome against the backdrop of the American political
tradition, and asserts that the Court has imposed upon Georgia and
the other states singled out by.the Voting Rights Act a theory of
democracy that is essentially foreign to the American experience.
This article thus challenges the underlying assumption of the Court's
ruling that a system of proportional representation, guaranteeing
the election of Negro candidates, will necessarily enhance the in-
fluence of the black community in local affairs.
I. GENESIS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
Although the Equal Protection Clause frequently has been uti-
lized to protect the right to vote, the fifteenth amendment, declar-
ing that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged "on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude," was origin-
ally intended to serve as the real workhorse of Negro suffrage."
Two months after the amendment was adopted, Congress, exercising
its new enforcement powers under section 2,12 passed the Enforce-
11. That the framers of the fourteenth amendment never intended to protect poli-
tical rights and Negro suffrage under the equal protection clause is convincingly
argued by R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 52-192 (1977).
12. The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments contain almost identically
worded sections empowering Congress to enforce them. Section 2 of both the thir-
teenth and fifteenth amendments provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce
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ment Act of 1870.11 But this measure, which sought to prohibit both
state and private action interfering with voting rights, was largely
unsuccessful. The Supreme Court struck down provisions of the Act
aimed at private action," and Congress in 1894 repealed most of the
remaining sections of the statute dealing with official action.'"
Congress then withdrew from the field, and for the next sixty
years the task of eliminating racial qualifications in the franchise
devolved principally on the Supreme Court. In 'carrying out this re-
sponsibility, the Court assiduously thwarted state efforts, whether
statutory or administrative, to disenfranchise the Negroes, even
reaching out to strike down attempts by political organizations to
exclude Negroes from voting in primary elections." Throughout this
period, the Court's discussion of Congress' enforcement powers
under the fifteenth amendment was necessarily limited to the issue
of whether Congress could proscribe private action. The only reme-
dial legislation passed by Congress was the Force Act of 1871,
designed to supplement the Enforcement Act of 1870 by providing
for the appointment of federal officers to supervise elections of
members of the House of Representatives." In Ex Parte Siebold
this article by appropriate legislation." Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
however, states that "The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this Article." The Court has discerned no difference among the
clauses and none was intended. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. at 207-08
n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 783-84 (1966)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127
(1903). Enforcement clauses have been routinely added to constitutional amendments
since the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments. See U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII,
§ 2, XIX, para. 2. XXIII, § 2, XXIV, § 2, XXVI, § 2 (proposed).
13. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). As originally introduced by Representative John
Bingham of Ohio (author of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment), the Act covered
only state action under the fifteenth amendment. Under the sponsorship of Senator
John Pool, a Republican from North Carolina, however, the Act was broadened to
cover private action and action interfering with rights under both the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments. See also the Force Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433.
14. James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903). The Court struck down section 5 of the
Act on the ground that the fifteenth amendment did not authorize Congress to pro-
hibit private interference with the right to vote.
15. Ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (1894); ch. 15, 35 Stat. 1153 (1909). The surviving statutes of
this period are 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (1976) (criminal) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a), 1983,
1985(3) (1976) (civil). The debates on the enactment and repeal of the Act are collected
in I B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 443-543,
803-34 (1970).
16. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
17. Ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871). In effect, the Act suppressed state electoral pro-
cesses.
18. 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
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the Supreme Court upheld the Force Act as a proper exercise of
Congress' powers under article I, section 4 (the "Times, Places and
Manners Clause"), without reaching the question of Congress' en-
forcement powers under the fifteenth amendment. In 1894, however,
this measure was repealed.
The general theory thus adopted concerning Congress' power
over the electoral process indicated that Congress could legislate
under the fifteenth amendment to protect the suffrage in all elec-
tions against state interference based on race, color, or previous con-
dition of servitude,"' whereas under article I, section 4, Congress
could legislate against public or private interference but only in
federal elections. Protection against private interference with the
right to vote in state elections was therefore thought to be beyond
the scope of Congress' powers.
Here matters stood when Congress reasserted its enforcement
powers in response to the civil rights movement that erupted in the
wake of Brown v. Board of Education." The first in a series of
remedial statutes designed to assist in federal enforcement of fif-
teenth amendment rights, the Civil Rights Act of 19571 made it un-
lawful for any person, whether acting as a public official or pri-
vately, to interfere with the right to vote in any election for federal
officers. At the heart of the Act's enforcement mechanism were pro-
visions authorizing the Attorney General to institute civil suits for
injunctions in aid of the right to vote in state, territorial, district,
municipal, or other territorial subdivision elections, and to seek
injunctive relief in the courts against violations of civil rights pro-
tected under section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871."
This Act was followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1960, which
again increased the powers of the executive branch and strengthened
existing procedures by authorizing the Attorney General to obtain a
finding, through the courts, of a "pattern or practice" of voter dis-
crimination in any jurisdiction. Upon the entering of such finding,
19. James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1876).
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28 &
42 U.S.C. (1976)).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(b), (c) (1964). Section 2 of the Klan Act is now 42 U.S.C. §
1985 (1976). In addition, the 1957 Act established a "temporary" United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights (subsequently extended on numerous occasions to 1981) to in-
vestigate civil rights violations and make recommendations to the President and Con-
gres, and provided for an additional Assistant Attorney General to direct a new Civil
Rights Division in the Department of Justice.
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which significantly removed the issue of Negro voting beyond a
case-by-case determination, all qualified Negroes would be regis-
tered to vote by court-appointed referees. 3
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 signaled a new direction
in voting rights legislation by restricting the rights of the several
states in their determination of voter qualifications. Unlike the
earlier statutes, which forbade the discriminatory application of
state voter qualification standards, the 1964 Act went beyond the
realm of regulation to impose the equivalent of a federal literacy
test. The Act not only prohibited the discriminatory administration
of literacy tests in federal elections, but also established a "rebut-
table presumption" of literacy for any prospective voter who had
completed the sixth grade in a school where the English language
had served as the basis of instruction.2 5
Finally, in the Voting Rights Act of 1965," Congress exceeded
what had previously been regarded as the limit of its authority
under the Enforcement Clause of the fifteenth amendment. Grounded
in part on section 2 of the fourteenth amendment and article I, sec-
tion 4 of the Constitution, the Voting Rights Act prohibited not only
various forms of state action in the electoral process, but also
private acts of voter intimidation in federal, state and local elec-
tions." Creating what are admittedly "stringent new remedies for
23. Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (1960) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 20 &
42 U.S.C. (1976)). The 1960 Act also authorized the appointment of federal voting
referees and provided safeguards for the protection and inspection of federal election
records.
24. Pub. L. No. 88-352. 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28 &
42 U.S.C. (1976)).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (a)(C)c) (1964).
26. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (1976)).
27. In its section-by-section analysis of the Act, the House Judiciary Committee
commented, in anticipation of a constitutional challenge, that
itihe power of Congress to reach intimidation by private individuals in purely
local elections derives from Article I, section 4, and the implied power of Con-
gress to protect Federal elections against corrupt influences, neither of which re-
quires a nexus with race. While Article I section 4 and the implied power of Con-
gress to prevent corruption in elections normally apply only to Federal elections,
and section 11 applied to all elections, these powers are plenary within their
scope, and where intimidation is concerned, it is impractical to separate its per-
nicious effects between Federal and purely local elections.
H. R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1965), as quoted in I1 B. SCHWARTZ,
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1502-03 (1970) (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of section 11 of the Act relating
to private actions interfering with voting rights in federal, state and local elections.
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voter discrimination,""' the Act established federal supervision over
state voter qualification tests and state electoral processes "which
in the thoroughness of its control is reminiscent of the Reconstruc-
tion era."" While strengthening judicial remedies, the Act also pro-
vided for direct federal intervention through a variety of complex
administrative remedies to remove both immediate and future im-
pediments to minority political participation and, representation.
Enacted in response to demonstrations in Selma, Alabama pro-
testing discriminatory voting registration practices, the Act was
originally conceived as a temporary expedient to end almost a cen-
tury of racial discrimination in the electoral process." The bill that
was submitted to Congress by President Lyndon Johnson on March
17, 1965 provided that the Act should remain in effect for ten
years.8 Congress rejected this proposal in favor of a five-year
period; but in 1970 Congress extended coverage of the Act for
another five years and in 1975 extended it again for seven.s With
two important exceptions, most provisions of the Voting Rights Act
are scheduled to "expire" in 1982.1
28. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
29. C. Rice, The Voting Rights Act of 1965: Some Dissenting Observations, 15 KAN.
L. REV. 159, 163 (1966).
30. The historical setting of the Act is discussed in II CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
SERVICE: CONGRESS AND THE NATION 1965-1968 356-64 (1969); see also South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-15 (1966) (discussing Congressional and judicial concern
over tactics regularly employed in the South to evade the fifteenth amendment and
prevent Negroes from voting). For a discussion of earlier federal efforts to enforce
Negro voting rights, see Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26
VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973); Note, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 51 VA. L.
REV. 1053 (1965).
31. Significant portions of the legislative history of the original act are contained
in H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1965), reprinted in [19651 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2437-508 and II B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1484; S. REP. No.
162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Joint Views of 12 Members of the Judiciary Committee
Relating to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, attached to S. REP. No. 162, supra, and
reprinted in [19651 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2540. President Johnson's March 15
address on voting rights to a joint session of Congress one week after the Selma
disturbance, and floor debate on the Act, are contained in II B. SCHWARTZ, supra note
27, at 1506.
32. Congressional action on the most recent extension of the Act in 1975 is con-
tained in Hearings on the Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 Before the Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings]; Hearings on the Extension
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975
Senate Hearings]; S. REP. No. 94-295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in [1975]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 774.
33. Technically speaking, a covered state would not be automatically exempt
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II. PROVISIONS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
A. General Provisions
The Act consists of nineteen sections, some of which are perma-
nent legislation of general application throughout the nation. Among
the general provisions is section 2, which prohibits the states from
using any racially discriminatory "voting qualification or prere-
quisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure."" Far-reaching
and reminiscent of the previously abandoned Force Act of 1871, sec-
tion 3(a) of the Act authorizes federal courts to replace state election
officials by federal examiners, with full power to examine and regis-
ter voters "whenever the Attorney General or an aggrieved person
institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce the guarantees
of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment in any State or political
subdivision." If the court finds that any voter qualification test has
been used in a discriminatory manner, it may suspend the use of the
test indefinitely and prevent the enforcement of any "voting qualifi-
cation or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure"
that is different from that in force when the proceeding was com-
menced, unless the court is satisfied that the procedure in question
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,"85 Section
10 of the Act, superseded by Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elec-
tions," and the twenty-fourth amendment banning the payment of
poll taxes as a requirement for voting, contains a Congressional find-
ing that the poll tax violated the fifteenth amendment; and it in-
structs the Justice Department to bring suit against its application.
under section 4 even if Congress failed to extend the Act beyond August 6, 1982, as it
would still be necessary for the state to bring an action for declaratory judgment. See
42 U.S.C. § 1973 b(a) (1976). 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976), in which subpart (a)(2Xc) prohibits
the use of a literacy test as a condition for voting, is permanent legislation. The bil-
ingual ballot requirements in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-la are not scheduled for expiration
until-August 6, 1985. Senator S. I. Hayakawa and Representative Paul McCloskey,
California Republicans, have introduced legislation calling for repeal of the bilingual re-
quirements. See note 272, infra. Senator Charles Mathias, a Maryland Republican, and
Representative Peter Rodino, a New York Democrat, introduced legislation on April 8,
1981 to extend the Voting Rights Act for ten years to August 6, 1992, and to nullify
the effects of City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). See N.Y. Times, April 8.
1981, at A10, col. 3.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976). The original act is reprinted as an Appendix to South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337-355.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a) (1976).
36. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1973h (1976).
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Other sections provide civil and criminal penalties for violations of
the Act."
B. Special Provisions
1. Sections 6-9: Federal Voting Examiners and Observers
The foundation of the Act rests on its special provisions, sec-
tions 4 through 9. These requirements are temporary and apply only
to selected states and political subdivisions. Sections 6 through 9 are
designed to strengthen earlier federal voting registration programs
by authorizing the Attorney General, at his discretion, to use ex-
aminers and observers where voting qualification tests have been
suspended under section 4 of the Act."9 Unless overruled by a Feder-
al District Court, the Attorney General may appoint federal ex-
aminers to enter a covered jurisdiction and decide who shall be eligi-
ble to vote in all federal, state and local elections, if: (1) he has
received complaints from twenty or more residents that they have
been denied the right to vote on account of race or color, and he
believes those complaints to be meritorious; or (2) in his judgment
"the appointment of examiners is otherwise necessary to enforce the
guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment."' 0 Examiners
are authorized to list individuals who satisfy state voter qualifica-
tions and to issue them a certificate evidencing their eligibility to
vote." Observers act as poll watchers to make certain that all eligi-
ble persons are permitted to vote and ascertain whether their
ballots have been accurately counted. The observers are field
employees of the Civil Service Commission or other federal agen-
cies. In the period between 1965 and 1974, more than 6,500
observers were sent into the Deep South, almost ,half of whom were
used to cover elections in Mississippi. 2 In general, both examiners
and observers have been used sparingly, and most served during
the first years when the Act went into effect. In the period between
1965 and 1975, only 60 counties and parishes -ever had examiners
and only 155,000 of the more than one million new minority
registrants in the covered states were registered by this method."
The limited use of examiners since 1970 underscores the early suc-
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973i-1973j (1976).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973e-1973g (1976).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1973d (1976).
41. 45 C.F.R. § 801.205 (1979).
42. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN
YEARS AFTER 35 (1975) (hereinafter cited as VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER).
43. Id. at 33.
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cess of the Voting Rights Act in getting Negroes registered to vote,
and probably the mere threat of examiners has deterred many local
registrars from blocking registration."
2. Section 4: Covered Jurisdictions
Sections 4(a) and 4(b) establish an automatic formula or "trigger-
ing" mechanism whereby a state (or one of its local units of govern-
ment) is prohibited from applying any "test or device"'" as a qualifi-
cation for voting in any election if the state or local unit maintained
any test or device on November 1, 1964 and less than 50 percent of
its voting age population was registered to vote or actually voted in
the 1964 presidential election. Amendments to the Act have extended
the coverage formula of section 4 to include jurisdictions that main-
tained a test or device on November 1, 1968 or 1972, and had less
than a 50 percent turnout in the 1968 or 1972 presidential elections."
Direct judicial review of the findings by the Attorney General which
trigger the suspension of tests is barred."?
Jurisdictions covered in 1965 and early 1966 included Alabama,
Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, 28
of the 100 counties in North Carolina, 4 of the 14 counties in Ari-
zona, Honolulu County, Hawaii, and Elmore County, Idaho. Since
1965, other jurisdictions have been added and coverage extends also
to Texas, certain counties in California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan,
New York, South Dakota, and Wyoming, and a number of towns in
the New England states of Massachusetts and New Hampshire."8
44. Id. at 34-35.
45. Section 4(c) of the Act defines a "test or device" as any requirement that a
person, as a prerequisite for registration or voting, demonstrate literacy, educational
achievement, knowledge, or good moral character, or produce registered voters or
other persons to vouch for his qualifications. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1976). See also 42
U,S.C. § 1973b(fX3) (1976).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1976).
47. Id. Under § 4(b) of the Act,
[tlhe provisions of subsection (a) shall apply in any state or in any political sub-
division of a state which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on
November 1, 1964, any test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director
of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting
age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50
per centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November. 1964.
A determination or certification of the Attorney General or of the Director of
Census under this section or under section 6 or section 13 shall not be reviewable
in any court and shall be effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
48. 45 Fed. Reg. 18898 (1980). For a listing of the various jurisdictions covered
from 1965-1975, see VOTING RIGHTs ACT: TEN YEARS AFTERa supra note 42, at 13-16.
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Under section 4(a) of the Act, however, a covered jurisdiction may
"bailout" and exempt itself if it can persuade the District Court for
the District of Columbia that the jurisdiction has not used a test or
device in a discriminatory manner for seventeen (originally five)
years preceding the filing of an action for a declaratory judgment."
Since 1965, only one state has succeeded in bailing out. In 1966, and
again in 1971, Alaska gained exemption, but the 1975 extension of
the Act re-established coverage. 0 One other state, Virginia, at-
tempted without success to bailout in 1973.1 Since 1970, all literacy
tests throughout the nation have been suspended under the Act. 2 In
addition, section 4(e) of the Act deals with the question of literacy.
Unlike most other provisions of the statute, which rest on Congress'
power to enforce the fifteenth amendment, section 4(e) was a last-
minute floor amendment to the Act based on the Enforcement Clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Designed by Senator Jacob Javits
(R.-N.Y.) and Robert Kennedy (D.-N.Y.) to emasculate the New York
State literacy test and expand the suffrage in New York City, sec-
tion 4(e) provides that the right to vote cannot be denied to any per-
son because of an inability to read or write English if that person
successfully completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school
where instruction was given in a language other than English.
3. Section 5: The "Preclearance" Requirement
Once a state or one of its political subdivisions has been sub-
jected to the strictures of section 4 and is prohibited from applying
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1976).
50. Alaska subsequently filed yet another bailout suit but abandoned it. See
Alaska v. United States, No. 78-0484 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 1979) (stipulated dismissal of
the action).
51. Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1974), affd mem., 420 U.S.
901 (1975).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1976). Amendments to the Act in 1970 also abolished dura-
tional residency requirements for Presidential elections and lowered the voting age to
eighteen. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 316.
318. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld the amend-
ments, except the proviso lowering the voting age for state and local elections, but this
objective was nevertheless achieved by the subsequent adoption of the twenty-sixth
amendment.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1976). Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan held in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), that section 4(e) was a valid exercise of the
powers granted to Congress by section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, and that the
New York English literacy requirement, as applied to disfranchised Puerto Ricans pro-
tected by section 4(e), was superseded by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of article VI
of the Constitution. The Court declined to rule on the question of whether New York's
literacy requirement was constitutional. See Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (1966).
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a voter qualification test, it may not thereafter make any changes in
its electoral laws unless the executive or judicial branches of the
federal government agree beforehand that such changes are nondis-
criminatory. Section 5 of the Act stipulates that no state or local
government may even enact a new law "or seek to administer any
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting [that is] different from
that in force or effect on November 1, 1964," without first gaining
the approval of the Attorney General or the United States District
Court in the District of Columbia."4 The announced purpose of the
section 5 preclearance provision "was to break the cycle of substitu-
tion of new discriminatory laws and procedures when old ones were
struck down."55 The more immediate objective of this provision is to
give government lawyers in the Voting Section of the Civil Rights
Division of the Justice Department direct and continuous ad-
ministrative supervision over the affected states and their political
entities, and to avoid the inconvenience of the judicial process. The
provision's obvious effect is to give the federal government a veto
over all new electoral laws enacted by the covered jurisdictions,
whose pre-existing voter qualification standards have been frozen
under section 4 of the Act.
Until 1971, section 5 was rarely employed to challenge state elec-
toral changes, owing in part to the Justice Department's preoccu-
pation with review of existing statutes and uncertainty as to the
scope of section 5's coverage." No less uncertain at the time was the
scope of the Attorney General's authority under section 5. Seemingly
a delegation of unfettered discretion regarding procedures, stan-
dards and administration, section 5 is silent with respect to the pro-
cedures the Attorney General must follow in deciding whether to
challenge a state submission for an electoral change, what standards
govern the contents of these submissions, and what. is meant by the
sixty-day provision of section 5 in which the Attorney General is to
respond to requests for his approval of electoral changes.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c (1976). Amendments to the Act have extended this restric-
tion to include laws that were in effect in 1968 and 1972.
55. VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 42, at 25.
56. Id. at 25, n.53; MacCoon, The Enforcement of the Preclearance Requirements
of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 107 (1979); see also
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 393 n.11 (1971).
57. Section 5 of the Act provides that a newly enacted electoral change may be
enforced if it is submitted to the Attorney General and he does not interpose an objec-
tion "within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown . .. Inleither
an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor
the Attorney General's failure to object . . . shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin en-
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Moreover, section 5 does not even authorize the Attorney General
to promulgate any regulations. Such regulations were nevertheless
issued in 1971, surviving constitutional attack in Georgia v. United
States." "If these regulations are reasonable and do not conflict
with the Voting Rights Act itself," declared Justice Stewart for the
Court, "then 5 U.S.C. section 301, which gives to '[tihe head of an
Executive Department' the power to 'prescribe regulation for the
government of his department' . . . is surely ample legislative
authority for the regulations." 9 Reversing the burden of proof,
which would ordinarily be carried by the federal government, the
Act and accompanying regulations require the submitting jurisdic-
tion to demonstrate to the satisfaction of a three-judge District
Court in Washington or the Attorney General that its proposed
change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.""
The regulations candidly acknowledge that "section 5 ... imposes on
the Attorney General what is essentially a judicial function.
Therefore, the burden of proof on the submitting authority is the
same in submitting changes to the Attorney General as it would be
in submitting changes to the District Court for the District of Col-
umbia."' Should a state or one of its political subdivisions fail to
submit a formal request for a change of its electoral laws, both the
Attorney General and private parties"2 may bring suit to enjoin en-
forcement of the law. Following a request for preclearance, the At-
torney General has sixty days in which to interpose an objection or-
allow the change to stand; and the voting practices submitted
become fully enforceable if the Attorney General fails to make a
timely objection.
The vagueness of this provision, inviting arbitrary discretion,
has produced considerable confusion and controversy. Although the
forcement of such qualification." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). Does any objection suffice?
May the Attorney General simply object to all section 5 submissions? See Georgia v.
United States, 411 U.S. 526. 542-43 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
58. 411 U.S. at 536.
59. Id. The Court cited United States v. Morehead, 243 U.S. 607 (1916) and Smith
v. United States, 170 U.S. 372 (1897) as authority for this proposition. The regulations
are contained in 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, §§ 51.1-51.29 (1971); see also D. HUNTER, FEDERAL
REVIEW OF VOTING CHANGES: How To USE SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2d ed.
1975).
60. 42 U.S.C, § 1973c (1976). As of 1975, the alternative of seeking a declaratory
judgment without review by the Attorney General had been used only once. VOTING
RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 42, at 29.
61. 28 C.F.R. § 51.19 (1971).
62. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1966).
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Act states that a new state law may be enforced if "the Attorney
General has not interposed an objection within 60 days after such
submission,""6 ie., of their filing, the regulations promulgated by the
Attorney General provide that no submission is complete until the
Attorney General has received all of the information that he deemed
essential in making a decision." The Act is silent as to the effect of
the sixty-day rule upon requests for reconsideration of an adverse
ruling by the Attorney General, but regulations specify that these
requests shall also be decided within sixty days of their receipt."
Neither the Act nor the regulations explain the application of the
sixty-day rule to supplements to requests for reconsideration. In City
of Rome, however, the Court upheld the Attorney General's inter-
pretation of his regulations on this question and ruled that the sixty-
day period commences anew when the submitting jurisdiction sup-
plies additional information on its own accord." "In recognition of
the Attorney General's key role in the formulation of the Act," said
Justice Brennan in United States v. Sheffield Board of Commis-
sioners, "this Court ... has given great deference to his interpreta-
tions of it.""
If the Attorney General fails to make an objection, the state
may enforce the change; but there is no certainty that the law will
remain in effect, for section 5 of the Act contains this qualifier:
"Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no
objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's failure to object,
nor a declaratory judgment ... shall bar a subsequent action to en-
join enforcement of such ... practice or procedure."" Continuous ad-
ministrative supervision over the states and their local units of
government is thus expected under the Act, even if -the courts break
the cycle and rule against the Attorney General. The broad scope
and massive burden of this entire operation is reflected in the statis-
tics compiled in the Justice Department. The 1975 Senate Hearings
on the extension on the Act revealed that in the period between
1965 and 1974, the Attorney General's staff processed more than
1,000 requests for voting changes each year."' In 1979, a Justice De-
partment official estimated that the Department's staff of eleven
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976) (emphasis added).
64. 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.3, 51.10(a), 51.18 (1971).
65. 28 C.F.R. § 51.3(d) (1971).
66. 446 U.S. at 171.
67. United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm., 435 U.S. 110, 131 (1978).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
69. 1975 Senate Hearing8, supra note 32, at 597; see also United States v. Shef-
field Bd. of Comm., 435 U.S. at 147 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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section 5 analysts was processing from fifty to seventy-five submis-
sions per week-more than double the number just five years*
earlier."0
These figures reflect a more than startling increase in section 5
litigation." More fundamentally, the figures reveal the radical trans-
formation of the Voting Rights Act that has taken place since 1970.7
When Justice Department officials, led by Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach, appeared before Congress in 1965 to explain
and defend President Johnson's proposed bill to eliminate discrimi-
natory voting practices, they emphasized the limited scope of the
Act. Its purpose, the officials uniformly agreed, was simply to re-
move the barriers to Negro voter registration. Those barriers, in
fact, were the very basis of the Selma demonstrations which promp-
ted the Johnson Administration to draft the bill. Appearing before a
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, Assistant Attor-
ney General Burke Marshall, in response to a question by a member
of the Committee, flatly stated that, "[tihe problem that the bill was
aimed at was the problem of registration, Congressman. If there is a
problem of another sort, I would like to see it corrected, but that is
not what we were trying to deal with in the bill."78 Before that same
body, Attorney General Katzenbach repeatedly emphasized that
"the whole bill really is aimed at getting people registered." "Our
concern today," he said, "is to enlarge representative government.
It is to solicit the consent of all the governed. It is to increase the
number of citizens who can vote."" Ten years later, testifying as a
70. MacCoon, supra note 56, at 113 n.45. In addition, the Voting Rights Section of
the Civil Rights Division maintains a mailing list of interested parties who receive a
weekly listing of current section 5 submissions. This procedure is designed to allow
private parties to monitor state and local governmental units for compliance and to
assist the Justice Department in enforcement of the Act. Id at 109 n.11. Also
strengthening enforcement and encouraging litigation is the 1975 amendment to the
Act which permits a court, at its discretion, to award attorney's fee to prevailing par-
ties in voting rights cases. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976). See Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10
(2d Cir. 1976).
71. In the period between 1965 and 1977, 6,400 electoral change requests were
submitted. Approximately 5,800 of these were made from 1971 to 1974. 1975 Senate
Hearings, supra note 32, at 597. See United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm., 435 U.S.
at 147 n.8 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. See Thernstrom, The Odd Evolution of the Voting Rights Act, 55 PuB. IN.
TEREST 49 (1979).
73. Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 2, at 74 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965
House Hearings]. See also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. at 564 (1969).
74. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 73, at 21. When asked, "how far down the
political scale" the term "political subdivisions" went, Katzenbach replied: "I believe
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private citizen before a Senate subcommittee in support of the 1975
extension of the Act, Katzenbach reiterated his understanding of
the original intent of the legislation:
The Voting Rights Act was originally designed to eliminate two
of the principal means of frustrating the 15th Amendment rights
guaranteed to all citizens: the use of onerous, vague, and unfair
tests and devices enacted for the purpose of disfranchising
blacks; and the discriminatory administration of these and other
kinds of registration devices. The Voting Rights Act attempted
to eliminate these racial barriers, first by suspending all tests
and devices in the covered States, and second, by providing for
voter registration in those States by Federal officials where
necessary to insure the fair administration of the registration
system."
That the Justice Department's understanding of the purpose of the
legislation was shared by Members of Congress who participated in
the formation of the Voting Rights Act is abundantly evident from a
careful reading of Congressional debates and committee hearings
and reports. As Joseph Tydings (D.-Md.), a member of the Senate
Judiciary Committee stated while leading debate on the Senate
floor, the provisions for the suspension of literacy tests and the ap-
pointment of federal examiners were "the heart of the bill."16
The success of the Act in terms of registration was almost in-
stantaneous, and by 1972 more than one million new Negro voters
were registered in the seven southern states covered by the Act."
By the early 1970's, however, a new development became evident-
the problem of registration, by then essentially solved, had been
eclipsed by the preclearance provisions of the Act. Section 5, an-
nounced the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1975, was
now "the focus of the Voting Rights Act."'8
III. Allen v. State Board of Elections: THE NEW RIGHT TO
POLITICAL OFFICE
The catalyst for this change was not a Congressional alteration
of the Act, but the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the
that the term 'political subdivision' used in this bill is intended to cover the registra-
tion area and that the whole bill really is aimed at getting people registered." Id.
75. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 121.
76. II B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1526.
77. VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 42, at 41. Between 1964
and 1972, the number of new black registrants actually increased by 1,148,621, an in-
crease from 29 percent to over 56 percent of the blacks of voting age. Id. at 43.
78. Id. at 25.
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scope of section 5 in the 1969 case of Allen v. State Board of Elec-
tions.7 As Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General for the
Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, explained:
The Congressional hearings on the 1970 Amendments to the
Voting Rights Act reflect that section 5 was little used prior to
1969 and that the Department of Justice questioned its workabil-
ity. Not until after the Supreme Court, in litigation brought
under section 5 had begun to define the scope of section 5 in...
[the Allen case] did the Department begin to develop standards
and procedures for enforcing section 5."
In Allen- the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Warren, held
that a state covered by the Act must submit for federal approval
not only new laws that might tend to deny Negroes their right to
register and vote, but all laws that might also tend to have an ad-
verse effect on the political strength of the Negro community in
government. In other words, the Allen decision brought about a
complete metamorphosis of the Act and the fifteenth amendment,
converting the right of the individual into a collective right of the
Negro population to an elected representative -in effect a guaran-
teed right of racial minorities to hold office, whether or not they
command majority support.
The Allen case involved three Mississippi laws and a routine ad-
ministrative change in Virginia that had altered election practices
without preclearance from the Attorney General. In 1966, the Mis-
sissippi legislature amended its election laws to provide that
members of county boards of supervisors could be elected at large
and that in eleven specified counties the superintendent of schools
would henceforth be appointed by the board of education. The third
law changed the requirements for independent candidates running
in general elections. The Virginia case concerned a bulletin issued
by the Board of Elections instructing election judges to aid any il-
literate voter who requested help in marking his ballot."' Whereas
the Mississippi amendments arguably were designed to minimize the
political impact of the Negro voter, the record showed that the new
Virginia regulation was wholly free of discriminatory purpose. In
79. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
80. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 581.
81. The appellants were illiterate voters who had attempted to vote for a write-in
candidate by sticking labels printed with the candidate's name on the ballot. The
voting change was challenged in the district court as instituting a literacy test pro-
hibited under section 4. Not until they argued before the Supreme Court did ap-
pellants raise the section 5 issue. 393 U.S. at 553-54.
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fact, Virginia election officials had issued the regulation in the belief
that existing state voting practices did not conform to the Voting
Rights Act."
Without reaching the issue whether these electoral changes
were discriminatory, the Court consolidated the four cases and
remanded them back to the district courts with instructions to issue
injunctions against enforcement of the enactments until the Attor-
ney General had given his approval that the changes met the re-
quirements of section 5." In response to the appellees' argument
(based on Congressional hearings) that the scope of section 5 was in-
tended to cover only those changes dealing with voter registration
and the right to vote, Chief Justice Warren asserted that "[t]he
legislative history on the whole supports the view that Congress in-
tended to reach any state enactment which altered the election law
of a covered state in even a minor way.""u This conclusion was war-
ranted, said the Chief Justice, not by the wording of section 5, but
by that of section 2, which referred to any "voting qualifications or
prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure."8 The
word "procedure" in this section contained no exceptions, indicating
"an intention to give the Act the broadest prossible scope . . .
Warren thus presumed that the framers of the Voting Rights
Act intended that federal regulation of voting procedures should in-
clude not only those procedures relating to registration and voting,
but also those affecting voter impact and election results. Drawing
from the Court's "vote dilution" rationale in the reapportionment
cases developed under the fourteenth amendment, Warren concluded
82. Id. at 552-53.
83. These suits were instituted by private persons and did not originate in the
District Court for the District of Columbia. Although the Act does not provide for a
private cause of action, the Court, citing JJ.. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
declared that there was an implied right of action because section 5 would be an "empty
promise" unless a private individual could seek judicial enforcement of the prohibition.
393 U.S. at 557.
84. 393 U.S. at 566.
85. Id. at 567 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1964 ed., Supp. II). Section 2 of the Act pro-
vided simply that "[njo voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standing, prac-
tice or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to
deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color." Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965)
(amended 1975)). This section was amended in 1975 to include guarantees set forth in
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1976). See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(g) (1976).
86. 393 U.S. at 566-67. Significant in Warren's opinion was a colloquy between
Katzenbach and Senator Hyrom Fong, Republican, Hawaii, in which the Attorney
General said that the word "procedure" was "intended to be all-inclusive of any kind of
practice." Id at 566.
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that "[tihe Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the
obvious .... [Ijt gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote,
recognizing that voting includes 'all action necessary to make a vote
effective.' ""
In the main, Warren's broad interprietation of section 5's
coverage thus rested on statutory language rather than legislative
history; for the phrase "all action necessary to make a vote effec-
tive," seen here as a linchpin of the Allen decision, is taken from the
Voting Rights Act itself. Significantly, however, this language is
drawn from section 14 of the Act, and not the preclearance provi-
sions.u This section of the Act, it was generally agreed during the
course of Congressional deliberation, was simply declaratory of the
fifteenth amendment. Senator Everett Dirksen (R.-Ill.), one of the
principal sponsors of the Act, observed at one point that all of the
states, including those not covered by section 5, were prohibited
from discriminating against Negro voters by section 2. Dirksen de-
scribed this term as "almost a rephrasing of the fifteenth amend-
ment," not the fourteenth, and Attorney General Katzenbach
agreed." Therefore one can reasonably doubt whether the Court's
incorporation of section 2 and the fourteenth amendment reappor-
tionment cases into section 5 is consistent with the intent and mean-
ing of the statute or its legislative history.'
Such was the basis of Justice Harlan's lengthy dissent in Allen,
which vigorously assailed the Court's opinion as "an overly broad
87. Id. at 565-66 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(i) (1964 ed., Supp. I)). See Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). See also White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Fortson
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
88. Section 14 of the Act, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1) (1976), defines the
terms "vote" and "voting" as follows:
The terms "vote" and "voting" shall include all action necessary to make a vote
effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but not limited to,
registration, listing pursuant to this subchapter, or other action required by law
prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, or having such ballot counted properly and
included in the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for
public or party office and propositions for which votes are received in an election.
89. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980). In the Mobile case, the
Court ruled that the practice of electing city commissioners at-large (dating back to
1911 and not an electoral change falling within section 5) was not an unfair dilution of
Negro voting strength in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, or of the four-
teenth or fifteenth amendments.
90. When examined in its proper context, the phrase "all action to make a vote ef-
fective" hardly supports Warren's proposition, inasmuch as the section refers
specifically to qualifications and procedures concerning registration and balloting, and
is silent on the question of post-election results. See text of 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1)
(1976), cited in note 88, supra.
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construction of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.." 1 In the first
place, argued Harlan, the Chief Justice had erroneously assumed
that section 5 could be severed from the Act and considered inde-
pendently. "In fact, however, the provision is clearly designed to
march in lockstep with section 4." ' To construe section 5 separately
was to lift it out of context in derogation of the obvious reciprocal
relationship between the two provisions. Section 4, which suspended
all literacy tests and similar "devices" in order to eliminate voter dis-
crimination at the registration stage, necessarily determined the
scope of section 5, a backup provision designed to prevent states
covered by section 4 from evading its restrictions through the crea-
tion of new voter qualification tests." Justice Black had made the
same observation earlier in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,"' the
point being, as Harlan explained, that section 5 "was not designed to
implement new substantive policies, but ... to assure the effective-
ness of the dramatic step that Congress had taken in section 4. The
Federal approval procedure found in section 5 only applied to those
states whose literacy tests or similar 'devices' have been suspended
by section 4."'1 In short, the only purpose of section 5 was "to imple-
91. 393 U.S. at 582.
92. Id. at 584.
93. Justice Harlan offered no legislative history to support his point, apparently
believing that it was self-evident. But the legislative record clearly substantiates his
claim. For example, Senator Philip Hart, Democrat, Michigan, a prime sponsor of the
Act, said that its "two central features" were section 4 and the provisions for federal
examiners. "Section 5," he stated, "is supported by much the same evidence as
underlies the suspension of tests or devices. This provision is a further appropriate
assurance that 15th Amendment rights will not be denied, either by laws currently in
force, or by fertile imaginations." II B, SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1517, 1521. Senator
Joseph Tydings, (D.-Md.) also described the "principal provisions of the bill" as the
suspension of tests and the appointment of federal examiners. Id. at 1526.
94. 383 U.S. at 356 ("Section 4(a) to which § 5 is linked, suspends for five years all
literacy tests . . . coming within the formula of § 4(b).") (d).
95. 393 U.S. at 584. "The statutory scheme contains even more striking
characteristics," Harlan continued, "which indicate that § 5's federal review procedure
is ancillary to § 4's substantive commands. A state may escape § 5, even though it has
constantly violated this provision, so long as it has complied with § 4, and has suspended
the operation of literacy tests." Id. By its very nature, in other words, section 5
monitored only new practices that a section 4(b) jurisdiction sought to implement after
the date it was designated. A discriminatory practice in effect before designation could
not logically be subject to preclearance. Thus in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130
(1976), the Court held that a New Orleans reapportionment plan which continued the
use of at-large councilmen seats that had been in existence without change since 1954
could not be tested under section 5. See Comment, Voting Rights- Voting Rights Act
of 1965 § 5-Federal Preclearance of Local Election Laws, 25 N.Y.L. REV. 170-71
(1979).
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ment the policies of section 4.... ."" The Court's broad construction
of section 5, Harlan concluded, was nothing less than
a revolutionary innovation in American government that goes
far beyond that which was accomplished by section 4. The fourth
section of the Act had the profoundly important purpose of per-
mitting the Negro people to gain access to the voting booths of
the South once and for all. . . .In moving against 'tests and
devices' in section 4. Congress moved only against those tech-
niques that prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did
not attempt to restructure state governments."
Further, argued Harlan, the Court had improperly read the four-
teenth amendment into section 5, mistakenly assuming "that Con-
gress intended to adopt the concept of voting articulated in Reynolds
v. Sims ...and protect Negroes against a dilution of their voting
power."'8 Harlan's point was well taken. Both the statutory language
and the legislative history of the Act, which Harlan cited extensively,
revealed that Congress deliberately rejected the construction which
the Court was now making.
Congress didn't casually overlook the fourteenth amendment, it
"consciously refused to base section 5 of the Voting Rights Act on
its powers under the-Fourteenth Amendment, upon which the reap-
portionment cases are grounded," asserted Harlan. Indeed, he con-
tinued, "[tjhe Act's preamble states that it is intended 'to enforce
the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States...
.,"" Thus the relevant case was not Reynolds v. Sims but Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, and section 5 "should properly be read to require
federal approval only of those state laws that change either voter
qualifications or the manner in which elections are conducted.""'
That Chief Justice Warren had incorporated section 2 of the Act
as well as the fourteenth amendment into the preclearance provi-
sions of section 5 apparently escaped Justice Harlan's attention in
the Allen decision, and Warren's peculiar reading of the statute con-
cerning the scope of section 5 has gone unchallenged in subsequent
cases before the Court. Indeed, Harlan's insightful dissent has been
relegated to oblivion, and Warren's claim that section 5 must be
given the "broadest possible scope"'"' has become the rallying cry
96. 393 U.S. at 585.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 588.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 591.
101. Id. at 567.
[Vol. 42
VOTING RIGHTS ACT
for the continued expansion of federal control over electoral changes
in the covered jurisdictions. In an outpouring of decisions since 1969,
all resting on the questionable assumptions laid down in Allen, the
Court has interpreted section 5 to require federal preclearance of.
laws changing the location of polling places' 02 annexations,' and
reapportionment and redistricting."'
This line of decisions does not include the Mississippi cases con-
solidated in Allen imposing section 5 on laws adopting at-large
systems of election, providing for the appointment of previously
elected officials, and regulating candidacy," 6 or the more recent in-
trusions upon state sovereignty in 1978 sanctioned in the Sheffield
and Dougherty cases. In United States v. Board of Commissioners of
Sheffield, Alabama,'" the Court declared that section 5 applied not
only to counties and other local units of government that actually
register voters, but to any entity within a covered jurisdiction having
any power over any aspect of the electoral process. The city of Shef-
field, Alabama, which did not even conduct voter registration, con-
tended unsuccessfully that it was exempt from section 5 because the
Act, by its own terms, applied only to "states and political subdivi-
sions," and according to section 14(c)(2) a political subdivision was
defined as a county or other political entity which conducts voter
registration. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan brushed aside
this construction as unduly restrictive. The Act was intended to sub-
ject all political entities to preclearance, Brennan insisted, and
whether a local unit registered voters was immaterial since "cities
can enact measures with the potential to dilute or defeat the voting
rights of minority group members- .. 07 Similarly, in Dougherty
County, Georgia Board of Education v. White"'0 the Court reaffirmed
the Sheffield doctrine that any political entity within a covered area
under section 4 must obtain the approval of the Attorney General if
the political entity adopts any new law impacting upon the electoral
102. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
103. See City of Richmond, Va. v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975): City of
Petersburg, Va. v. United States, 410 U.S. 962 (1973), summarily aff g 354 F. Supp.
1021 (D.D.C. 1972).
104. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S.
526 (1973). See also United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) In
Georgia, the Court found that by extending the Act for another five years in 1970,
Congress ratified the sweeping interpretation of section 5 in Allen and Perkins. See
411 U.S. at 533.
105. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
106. 435 U.S. 110 (1978).
107. Id. at 124.
108. 439 U.S. 32 (1978).
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process. At issue in Dougherty was a rule promulgated by a local
school board concerning candidacy qualifications. Finding Sheffield
dispositive, the Court held that section 5 governed, dismissing the
contention that the school board was exempt under the Act because
it did not conduct elections.
Thus, one may conclude that the scope of section 5 is boundless.
Even those who look favorably upon these results are quick to agree,
however, that the Court has stretched the Act beyond its natural
limits. As the Director of the Section 5 Unit of the Justice Depart-
ment's Civil Rights Division has frankly acknowledged, "[mjere im-
pact on the political process as the defining principle for section 5
coverage ... could lead to a slippery slope down which falls nearly
everything that a political jurisdiction does. Congress probably did
not intend section 5 to become such an all-encompassing mechanism."1',
Conceivably, the preclearance requirement could be extended to
cover every act of government at the state and local level, inasmuch
as any change ultimately affects, directly or indirectly, minority
group interests. Reaching conflicting results, lower federal courts
have already dealt with the question whether political parties are
subject to section 5.1 Apparently, zoning changes, gerrymandering,
and the location of public schools and housing projects are all likely
candidates for future extensions of section 5, since these matters
arguably may affect minority voting strength. Case law indicates
that only court-ordered reapportionment plans and other court-
ordered electoral changes are clearly exempt from the broad sweep
of section 5."1
Behind these developments lies a radical redefinition of the
right to vote in American politics. The Voting Rights Act was
launched for the purpose of giving minority groups greater access to
the ballot. Supreme Court decisions since the watershed case of
Allen v. State Board of Elections"' have shifted the focus from ac-
cess to result:
They assume a Federally guaranteed right to maximum political
109. MacCoon, supra note 56, at 114.
110. Compare Williams v. Democratic Party, No. 16286 (N.D. Ga. April 6, 1972).
aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 809 (1972) and United States v. Democratic Executive Comm., No.
70-6047 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 1970) (political parties are not subject to section 5) with
MacGuire v. Amos, 343 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Ala. 1972) and Wilson v. North Carolina
State Bd. of Elections, 317 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D.N.C. 1970) (political parties are covered
by section 5). The Act's definition of "vote" refers specifically to both party primaries
and general elections. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 I(c)(1) (1976).
111. MacCoon, supra note 56, at 114-16.
112. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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effectiveness. Nowadays local electoral arrangements are ex-
pected to conform to Federal executive and judicial guidelines
established to maximize the political strength of racial and
ethnic minorities, not merely to provide equal electoral oppor-
tunity . .. That no one in 1965 contemplated such a develop-
ment is indisputable."3
In brief, both the Act and the fifteenth amendment have become an
instrument for elevating the traditional right of equal opportunity to
a new plateau of equal result.
IV. City of Rome v. United States:
THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEE OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
The basic structure of government in the City of Rome was
established under a charter granted by the state legislature in 1918.
The charter provided for a seven-member commission, with one
member from each of seven wards. In 1929, two additional wards
were annexed, raising the total to nine. Members of the Commission
were elected concurrently, at-large, by plurality vote, and they were
also required to meet a residency requirement. In addition, the
charter made provision for a Board of Education consisting of five
members, to be elected in the same manner with the exception of a
residency requirement.""
In 1966, soon after the Voting Rights Act was passed, the
Georgia General Assembly amended the City's charter in order to
make numerous changes in Rome's system of government. The plu-
rality vote requirement for members of the Commission and Board
of Education was changed to majority vote, and provision was made
for primary and run-off elections; the number of wards was reduced
from nine to three, with one commissioner from one of three num-
bered posts in each ward; the size of the Board of Education was in-
creased from five to six members, with one member from one of two
numbered posts in each of three wards and each candidate required
to be a resident of the ward in which he ran; staggered elections for
members of the Commission and Board of Education were instituted;
restrictions on voter qualifications were eased; and the task of voter
registration was transferred to the county. In the period following
November 1, 1964, some sixty annexations were also effected, either
by local ordinance or state law.' 5
113. Thernstrom, supra note 72, at 50.
114. City of Rome v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 223 (D.D.C. 1979).
115. Id. at 224.
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Not until 1974, when the City submitted an annexation for sec-
tion 5 preclearance, did the Attorney General learn of these numer-
ous changes. Rome then submitted each one to the Attorney Gen-
eral for approval, with the exception of the transfer of voter
registration to Floyd County, which the Attorney General did not
oppose. After examining the various changes, the Attorney General
agreed to preclear forty-seven of the sixty annexations, the reduc-
tion of wards from nine to three, the increase in the size of the
Board of Education from five to six, and the liberalization of voter
qualifications. But the Attorney General objected to thirteen annex-
ations, the provisions for majority vote, run-off, numbered post and
staggered term elections, and the residency requirement for Board
of Education elections."' Nine of the thirteen tracts of land were ac-
tually vacant when they were annexed by the city.
The City of Rome then brought suit challenging the Attorney
General's actions on six grounds. During the course of litigation, two
of the plaintiff's claims were eliminated,"' leaving the following four
claims: (1) That Rome was entitled to "bail-out" from coverage under
section 4 of the Voting Rights Act; (2) That some or all of the
changes to which the Attorney General was opposed had actually
been precleared; (3) That section 5 was an unconstitutional exercise
of Congressional power; and (4) That the disputed changes had
neither the purpose nor the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on the basis of race. Significantly, the City did not rely on
Justice Harlan's key opinion in Allen concerning the scope of section
5 and its application to Rome's electoral changes, or raise the issue
of whether it was intended or proper to view section 5 in light of
the fourteenth amendment and the "vote dilution" rationale set
forth in the reapportionment cases. In foregoing the opportunity to
lay bare the jerry-built foundation of the Allen case, the City
necessarily obscured its fourth claim regarding the purpose and ef-
fect test. Preferring to attack Congress rather than the courts and
follow Justice Black's line of Katzenbach dissents in a frontal, if not
suicidal, assault against Congress' enforcement powers under the fif-
teenth amendment, Rome further weakened its position by failing to
confront the Congressional debates on the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871, the one and only instance when the framers and backers of the
116. Itt at 229.
117. Rome's allegation that the Attorney General had acted unconstitutionally in
applying section 5 to the City was dismissed on the basis of Morris v. Gressette, 432
U.S. 491 (1977), and Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404 (1977). The City conceded that it was
the kind of jurisdiction subject to section 5 as determined by the Sheffield case.
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Reconstruction Amendments explored in depth their understanding
of Congress' enforcement powers. Nor did the City of Rome invoke
the legislative history of the fifteenth amendment to challenge the
Voting Rights Act, a fruitful source of information that would have
buttressed its constitutional case.
No less exceptional is the utter failure of the Justice Depart-
ment to produce evidence that any of the numerous electoral changes
promulgated by the City of Rome had the purpose of discriminating
against the City's handful of Negro voters. Indeed, the evidence is
so supportive of the City's good intentions and the prevalence of
long-standing, mutually agreeable race relations and voting prac-
tices, as to warrant extensive reiteration. The District Court's find-
ings, based on exhaustive testimony, revealed that the City of Rome
had not employed any literacy tests or other devices as a prere-
quisite to voter registration for seventeen years-before the magic
date of November 1, 1964. Although registrants were technically re-
quired to pass the Georgia literacy or character tests, affidavits of
registration officials, supported by the unanimous testimony of black
deponents, showed that such tests had never been applied in a dis-
criminatory manner, and in recent years had not been used at all.
Likewise, Rome had not attempted to impede registration through
manipulation of requirements relating to time and place, registration
personnel, purging or re-registration. In the period from 1964 to
1974, Negro registration remained at a relatively high level, which
the District Court conceded was "[apso probative of the lack of dis-
crimination in registration . . .""
Moreover, the evidence showed that Negroes had not been de-
nied access to the ballot through the inconvenient location of polling
places, the actions of election officials, or the treatment of illiterate
voters. No obstacles had been placed before black candidates with
respect to slating of candidates, filing fees, or access to voters at
polling places. Further, whites, including city officials, had encour-
aged Negroes to run for office in Rome, and one Negro was even ap-
pointed to the Board of Education."'
Outside the area of voting, the record was equally free of dis-
crimination. The elected officials and city manager of the City, con-
cluded the District Court,
are responsive to the needs and interests of the black community.
The City has not discriminated against blacks in the provision of
118. 472 F. Supp. at 224.
119. 1d at 225.
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services and has made an effort to upgrade some black neighbor-
hoods. The City transit department, with a predominantly black
ridership, is operated through a continuing City subsidy. And
the racial composition of the City workforce approximates that
of the population, with a number of blacks employed in skilled or
supervisory positions."'
Finally, 'the city demonstrated that because Negroes in the City of
Rome usually held the balance of power in municipal elections, white
candidates "vigorously" sought their support and "spent proportion-
ally more time campaigning in the black community" '21 than in their
own.
In response to such overwhelming evidence rebutting the pre-
sumption of discrimination, the federal government offered only one
argument-the crux not only of this case but of almost the whole
body of federal law that had grown out of the Allen rationale: All
this is true, but "most black voters would prefer to have a black of-
ficial representing their interests."'1 The obvious assumption, which
the City had quite successfully refuted, was that whites could not
fairly represent the interests of the minority, so the case turned not
on any discernible denial of voting rights but on the racial prefer-
ences of the blacks for black officeholders and their collective
"right" to hold office through proportional representation. The
Court noted that only four Negroes had ever sought office in Rome;
and evidence existed, though not conclusive, of bloc voting, which
weighed heavily against the city."2 That bloc voting perpetuating
the division between the black and white communities would be an
absolute certainty if the blacks were given their own seat on the
Commission and Board of Education did not enter into the Court's
discussion.
Thus committed to a "winner-take-your-share" theory of elec-
tions, or a separatist view of fundamental fairness based on the no-
tion that no racial minority shall be denied the right to political
representation, the District Court predictably ruled against the City
of Rome on all four counts. Rome's request to "bail-out" from section
5's coverage was rejected on the ground that Congress did not in-
tend that municipalities in covered states should be permitted to ex-
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. One unsuccessful Negro candidate for office "did receive a sizeable number
of white votes"-45 percent of the total votes cast in a run-off election in a city with
only 15 percent Negro registration. Id. at 227.
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empt themselves independently, as this practice would create an ad-
ministrative burden on the Justice Department and open the door to
a resurgence of the "same evils" which the Act was designed to
eliminate1 2'-an argument that hardly seemed applicable to a city
like Rome that already had established a commendable record of
race relations. Rome's argument that the Attorney General's pre-
clearance of the Georgia Municipal Election Code in 1968 also con-
stituted preclearance of the City's electoral changes was countered
by the argument that "submission of state laws authorizing munici-
palities to adopt certain provisions in their charters does not con-
stitute submission of the actual exercise of this authority by local
government"' 25-a position seemingly exacerbating the Justice De-
partment's administrative burden. The City's constitutional chal-
lenge to section 5, alleging that the preclearance requirement ex-
ceeded Congress' enforcement powers, violated the tenth amend-
ment and the Guarantee Clause, and infringed the rights of private
plaintiffs joined in the suit, was dismissed on the basis of South
Carolina v. Katzenbach.126 Acknowledging the presence of "an under-
current of dissent" within the ranks of the Supreme Court on this
issue, the District Court nevertheless declined the plaintiff's invita-
tion "to a life of high adventure," noting that "[f]ar from backing
away from Katzenbach the Court has in the ensuing years often
cited that case with approval."'2
In response to the City's claim that Congress lacked the enforce-
ment power to prohibit a state or local unit of government from im-
plementing voting changes that had the effect but not the purpose
of diluting Negro voting strength, the District Court agreed that the
issue of "[wihether the Fifteenth Amendment reaches only purpose-
ful discrimination is an important and unsettled constitutional ques-
tion" which the Supreme Court had "never explicitly addressed....,, 28
Even if the amendment itself reached only purposeful discrimina-
tion, however, "Congress was within its broad enforcement power ...
when it outlawed voting changes discriminatory in effect only." This
bold pronouncement suggesting that Congress' section 2 enforce-
ment powers exceed the substantive provisions of section 1 of the
fifteenth amendment, despite the words of limitation that Congress
is empowered to enforce only "these provisions," amounts to little
124. Id. at 231-32.
125. Id at 233.
126. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
127. 472 F. Supp. at 235.
128. Id. at 237.
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less than a complete nationalization of state electoral processes. The
Court's statement further assumes, of course, that Congress did in
fact outlaw voting changes "discriminatory in effect only" by enact-
ing the Voting Rights Act, an assumption made by Chief Justice
Warren in the Allen case that rests, as noted earlier, on precarious
footing. Thus the real question, not raised in these proceedings, is
not simply whether Congress may outlaw state voting practices
under the fifteenth amendment that merely dilute Negro voting
strength and impede the election of Negroes, but also whether Con-
gress ever intended to do so in the first place. The District Court's
foray into "a life of high adventure" to find the outer limits of Con-
gress' mysteriously expanding enforcement powers, which began
with a refusal to take the first step when asked to reexamine Kat-
zenbach and ended here with the discovery of a new galaxy of legis-
lative power in City of Rome, was possible then only because
Justice Harlan's crucial dissent in Allen was never launched to in-
tercept the mission.
The District Court found additional support for its liberal con-
struction of the enforcement power in Ex parte Virginia"' and Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland.' "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution," Chief Justice Marshall had declared
in McCulloch in his classic formulation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, "and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."' Such was
the test of Congressional enforcement power that the Supreme
Court had applied back in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,"2 when it
first examined the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, and
the District Court found that test dispositive in determining
whether Congress could properly prohibit electoral practices under
the fifteenth amendment that had only a discriminatory effect.
Under the McCulloch standard, said the, court, "we have no doubt
but that section 5's ban on 'effect' discrimination is an appropriate
means even if it is assumed that the desired end is solely the elimi-
nation of purposeful discrimination,""' because "discriminatory ef-
fects raise a legitimate, and often compelling, inference of purpose."'"
129. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
130. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
131. 1d at 421.
132. 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966).
133. 472 F. Supp. at 238.
134. l&
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This inference, implicit in the Voting Rights Act, was based on a
thorough investigation by Congress, which
could well have concluded that wholesale evasion of the Act was
likely unless discriminatory effects could be taken as conclusive
evidence of purpose.. .. In effect, Congress can be said to have
instructed the courts that the existence of racially disproportion-
ate impact raises an irrebuttable presumption of invidious pur-
pose. We can see no constitutional impediment to Congress' tak-
ing such an approach. '
The assumption, once again, was that Congress took such an ap-
proach, an assumption which is not clearly supported by the record.
The Court, in fact, cited no legislative history lending weight to this
construction. It is noteworthy, however, that section 5 of the Senate
version of the Voting Rights Act, S.1564, provided that in order for
a state or political subdivision to obtain preclearance for a new
voting practice, that entity had the burden of proving that such a
change did not have the purpose "or" would not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote.13 But the House version,
H.R. 6400, used the conjunction "and." This choice of words was
ultimately adopted by the Conference Committee and made a perma-
nent fixture of the Act. ' The Court's reasoning thus seems contrary
to the deliberate intention of Congress and the wording of the
statute; for if the burden rests on the state to show that its elec-
toral change does not have the purpose and the effect of voter
discrimination, and the state has met the burden with respect to
purpose, simple logic leads to the conclusion that further inquiry in-
to the effect of a particular change would be warranted only if the
statute provided that the state must prove that its new voting prac-
tice did not have the purpose or the effect of voter discrimination.'"
The District Court experienced little difficulty, however, in
deciding that most of Rome's various electoral changes actually had
a discriminatory effect. "With respect to the majority vote and
runoff election provisions, the discriminatory effect is clear beyond
135. Id. at 238-39.
136. See II B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1533.
137. ld. at 1592.
138. In Senate debate on S. 1564. Senator Tydings, a principal spokesman for the
bill in the Senate Judiciary Committee, gave a carefully prepared address on the
Senate floor explaining each provision of the bill. In his remarks on section 5. Tydings
asserted: "Although the word 'or,' which frequently has a disjunctive meaning, is used.
it is intended that the petitioning state or subdivision must prove an absence of both
discriminatory purpose and effect." Id. at 1533.
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peradventure."'I' Although the effects of numbered posts, staggered
terms, and Board of Education residency provisions were somewhat
less clear, the City offered no rebuttal to the expert testimony of
the United States Commission of Civil Rights that such practices
deprived the Negro community of an opportunity to elect a Negro
through "single-shot" voting. 10 The annexations, however, posed a
more difficult problem. Deferring to the Justice Department, which
was willing to reconsider its objections to the annexation if the City
agreed to revert to the plurality win system, the court denied the
City's motion as regards the annexation and invited the City to
renew its request for preclearance.
The City's second constitutional argument, resting on federalism
and the tenth amendment, maintained that section 5 must be de-
clared unconstitutional under the principles established in National
League of Cities v. Usery."' In that case the Supreme Court held
that the tenth amendment imposed a limitation on Congress' power
to regulate commerce, and that Congress was therefore prohibited
by the principle of federalism from extending minimum wage and
maximum hour regulations through its commerce power to employ-
ees of state and local governments. The District Court refused to ap-
ply this reasoning to the Voting Rights Act, however, noting that
the Supreme Court had reserved the question whether the tenth
amendment also limited Congress' enforcement powers under the
fourteenth amendment. If the Supreme Court were confronted with
the issue, the District Court was nevertheless confident that the
Justices would follow Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,"2 a case decided only
four days after National League and also written by Justice Rehn-
quist, which held that the eleventh amendment did not operate as a
limitation on Congress' enforcement powers. "[Tihe Eleventh
Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it em-
bodies," said the Court in Fitzpatrick, "are necessarily limited by
the enforcement provisions of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."""' Both the tenth and eleventh amendments shared a common
grounding in states' rights and the principles of state sovereignty.
139. 472 F. Supp. at 244.
140. Id. The Commission described "single-shot" voting as a device which "'enables
a minority to win some at-large seats if it concentrates its vote behind a limited
number of candidates and if the vote of the majority is divided among a number of can-
didates."' Id. at n.90 (citation omitted). This technique is, of course, merely a form of
bloc voting.
141. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
142. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
143. Id. at 456.
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By parity of reasoning, the enforcement power of Congress under
the fifteenth amendment, which had a "common history" with that
of the fourteenth, was not limited by the federal principle.
"Although Fitzpatrick did not directly address the question
presented here," the court concluded, "we find that analytically it
compels a like result.""'
In effect, then, the District Court assumed that Congress' en-
forcement powers are broader than its commerce power, a construc-
tion that is nowhere supported in the debates on the framing and
adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments. Equally disturbing are
the far-reaching implications of the decision: if the enforcement
powers are not limited by the federal principle, apparently those
powers are not limited at all, except by the self-restraint of Con-
gress itself. Review of Congressional enactments by the Supreme
Court is a potential limit on the exercise of power, of course, but in
the absence of the tenth amendment few compelling reasons, if any,
would exist to nullify federal statutes that would necessarily be
directed against state action anyway. The District Court's reasoning
thus leads to the extraordinary conclusion that the Reconstruction
Amendments repealed the tenth amendment, a revolutionary doc-
trine that was roundly opposed, as will presently be seen, by the
members of Congress who framed the Reconstruction Amendments.
Moreover, the Court's analogy between the tenth and eleventh
amendments overlooks the different purposes these amendments
were designed to accomplish. The tenth amendment, encompassing
the Constitution in entirety, was intended to limit the powers of the
federal government to those delegated by the states, and to reaffirm
the principle that those powers not delegated were reserved to the
states and the people. The eleventh amendment, on the other hand,
was adopted for the narrow purpose of reversing the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.14 Although this provision
limits the federal judicial power, the amendment is directed not
against the federal government as such but against out-of-state and
foreign citizens. The amendment simply bars suits against a state by
citizens of other states, and by its terms does not even bar a suit by
a citizen against his own state. In short, the eleventh amendment is
almost totally unrelated to relations between the federal govern-
ment and the states and matters affecting the division of power be-
tween two levels of government. It is the tenth amendment which
addresses the question of power in the federal system. The eleventh
144. 472 F. Supp. at 240.
145. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
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amendment deals solely with the issue of sovereign immunity and
seeks to protect the states not against the federal government but
merely against suits by out-of-state citizens. To treat the two
amendments as an embodiment of the same principles and purposes
is to misconstrue the meaning of federalism under the American
constitutional system.
Turning finally to the two remaining constitutional issues raised
by City of Rome, the District Court quickly disposed of both in sum-
mary fashion. The City's contention that section 5 constituted a
violation of the Guarantee Clause was dismissed as a political ques-
tion not amenable to judicial resolution. In reply to the private
plaintiff's complaint that the actions of the Attorney General and
the operation of section 5 had prevented the City from holding elec-
tions since 1974 in contravention of the plaintiffs' civil rights, the
District Court responded with the curious observation that the City
of Rome was equally to blame because it had refused to cooperate
with the Attorney General. But "even if fundamental interests were
at stake .... " concluded the court, "we believe section 5 of the Act
is justifiable in advancing the compelling national interest of enforc-
ing the Fifteenth Amendment by 'erasing the blight of racial
discrimination in voting.'"" Whether this statement meant that fif-
teenth amendment rights were to be preferred to the so-called "Fun-
damental Freedoms" of the first amendment the Court did not say.
On appeal, City of Rome was argued before the Supreme Court
during the October Term, 1979. In affirming the judgment of the
lower court, a divided Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Marshall, closely followed the path of reasoning blazed by the
District Court, although with less attention to the finer points
developed by the District Court. Among the usual outpouring of con-
curring and dissenting opinions," ' only Justice Rehnquist, joined by
146. 472 F. Supp. at 242 (citations omitted).
147. Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred, the former conditioning his approval
on matters relating to annexation, the latter emphasizing the right of Congress to
regulate voting practices in Rome even though "there has never been any racial
discrimination practiced in the city." 446 U.S. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring). In dis-
sent, Justice Powell contended that the Court's ruling conflicted with Sheffield and
argued that the Court had misinterpreted the "bail-out" provisions of section 4 of the
Act. "The Court today," Justice Powell observed, "decrees that the citizens of Rome
will not have direct control over their city's voting practices until the entire State of
Georgia can free itself from the Act's restrictions." Id. at 203 (Powell, J.. dissenting).
This interpretation, he complained, would only serve to "vitiate the incentive for any
local government in a state covered by the Act to meet diligently the Act's re-
quirements." Id. at 206 (Powell, J.. dissenting.)
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Stewart, vigorously opposed the Court's interpretation of the Act
and insisted that Congress' enforcement powers were limited by the
substantive provisions of the fifteenth amendment. No member of
the Court challenged the constitutionality of the Act in line with
Justice Black's earlier dissents, or picked up on Justice Harlan's
astute criticisms in Allen concerning the scope of section 5.148 Rehn-
quist did insist, however, that since the enforcement power is a
"remedial" grant of authority, then the duty of the Court, in keeping
with Marbury v. Madison, was "to ensure that a challenged Congres-
sional Act does no more than 'enforce' the limitations on state
power established in the Fourteenth [Amendment]." " In this case
there was no wrong to remedy because the City of Rome had engaged
in no purposeful discrimination; and any dilution of the black vote
associated with the electoral changes at issue was the result of bloc
voting-a matter of private rather than governmental discrimina-
tion. Asserting that "the Constitution imposes no obligation on local
governments to erect institutional safeguards to ensure the election
of a black candidate,"'" and further insisting that Congress does not
have the power to impose such a duty, Rehnquist drew the curtain
on City of Rome with a stinging rebuke of the producers and direc-
tors for having abandoned the script of prior case law:
To permit congressional power to prohibit the conduct challenged
in this case requires state and local governments to cede far
more of their powers to the Federal Government than the Civil
War Amendments ever envisioned; and it requires the judiciary
to cede far more of its power to interpret and enforce the Con-
stitution than ever envisioned. The intrusion is all the more of-
fensive to our constitutional system when it is recognized that
the only values fostered are debatable assumptions about politi-
cal theory which should properly be left to the local democratic
process. "1
Rehnquist's parting shot suggesting that the Court had rewrit-
ten the fifteenth amendment to accommodate the majority's own
148. In a footnote, however, Justice Rehnquist indicated an awareness of the issues
raised by Justice Harlan, although Justice Rehnquist did not pursue the matter fur-
ther. Noting that the Voting Rights Act is an exercise of fifteenth amendment power
and that vote dilution devices involve the fourteenth amendment, Justice Rehnquist
nevertheless deferred to the Court's position that the Act may be applied to remedy
violations of the fourteenth amendment. 446 U.S. at 207-08 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
149. Id. at 211.
150. Id. at 219.
151. 1& at 221.
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theory of representation reflected the concern expressed earlier by
Justice Harlan in his Allen dissent that the Court's insistence on
Negro officeholders was not necessarily in the best interest of the
minority. "It is not clear to me," Harlan confessed, "how a Court
would go about deciding whether an at-large system is to be preferred
over a district system. Under one system, Negroes have some in-
fluence in the election of all officers; under the other, minority
groups have more influence in the selection of fewer officers."'52 To
be sure, a white majority dominating a multi-member commission
would be better able to ignore the interests of the Negro community
if the majority were spared the trouble of campaigning in that com-
munity for political support and could vote down the lone black
representative without fear of reprisal. Having undermined the need
for coalition-building, the Court, in other words may have actually
isolated the minority and in effect given it a meaningless role in the
political process. And there may be additional consequences, as yet
unseen. The Court's theory of representation apparently creates "in-
centives to keep a city ghettoized. Once a ward system is instituted,
the geographical dispersion of blacks cuts in to black power."'" In
brief, the Court's main accomplishment may well be "[t]he political
polarization of the society along racial and ethnic lines . ."I" and a
concomitant decline in the political efficacy of the Negro minority.
Looming ominously in the background is yet another disturbing
aspect about City of Rome that led Justice Powell to condemn the
Court's decision on grounds of fundamental fairness. "Even though
Rome has met every criterion established by the Voting Rights Act
for protecting the political rights of minorities," Powell complained,
"the Court holds that the City must remain subject to preclearance."'"
The larger issue, which the Court has not fully addressed, is the
overinclusiveness of section 4 of the act, which punishes the inno-
cent as well as the guilty by hurling all local communities of a
covered state, irrespective of their different racial, ethnic, political,
and historical backgrounds, into a common jail. Indeed, the problem,
which was hotly debated in Congress in 1965, 1970 and again in 1975,
extends to the discriminatory treatment of certain states, primarily
in the South, many of which have also made substantial progress in
the area of race relations but are unrewarded for their actions and
152. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 586 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
as quoted in 446 U.S. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
153. Thernstrom, supra note 72, at 65.
154. Id. at 75.
155. 446 U.S. at 196 n.4.
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unable, like the City of Rome, to bail out and resume their independ-
ence on an equal footing with other members of the Union. That the
coverage formula in the original Act was also politically motivated
and arbitrary even within the South is suggested by the fact that
such states as Tennessee, Kentucky, Florida, and President
Johnson's own state of Texas were exempted, notwithstanding their
record on voter discrimination. Indeed, coverage was aimed almost
exclusively at the Deep South, which had supported Barry Gold-
water in the 1964 presidential election.'"
The case of Virginia amply demonstrates the inherent ar-
bitrariness of the Act. Appearing before the Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary in 1975 to testify against
the most recent extension of the Voting Rights Act, Attorney
General Andrew Miller of Virginia pointed out that in 1965 Virginia
was the only state, other than Alaska, which was "triggered" by the
Act in the absence of any evidence of racial discrimination in voting.
In fact, extensive investigations conducted by the United States
Commission on Civil Rights in the Commonwealth in 1961 revealed
that black citizens in Virginia, to quote the Commission's report, en-
countered "no significantly racially motivated impediments to vot-
ing."'8  Yet states where voting discrimination was known to exist
were exempted from the preclearance provisions of section 5 be-
cause they did not maintain any literacy tests. Paradoxically, the
Virginia literacy test simply required applicants to provide routine
information in their own handwriting concerning their names, ad-
dresses, age and occupation.
Superimposed on this matrix of arbitrary presumptions, the
156. Testifying against extending the Act in 1975, Senator James Allen (D.-Ala.)
observed that
when the theory of this . . . [Act] was evolved, it was first determined which
States the law should be made applicable to, and then they proceeded to find the
formula that would end up with those States being covered. And, by using the 50
percent voting in the election factor, that would have included the State of Texas.
The President of the United States being a resident of Texas, a citizen of Texas,
it was thought inadvisable to include Texas in that formula. So they added a sec-
ond circumstance, that is, that they must have a device that would hinder
registration; namely, the literacy test. And, the double factor . . . is what took
Texas out from under it, because they did not have the literacy test.
1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 24. Senator Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.) charged
earlier that "[tlhe Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a punitive measure designed to
punish the States that supported Goldwater for President." Hearings on Amendments
to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Seas. 7 (1969 & 1970).
157. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 825.
1981l
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Virginia Attorney General observed, was the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gaston County v. United States"6 which doomed Virginia's
chances of a bailout by prohibiting any state from terminating
coverage if discrepancies in educational opportunity previously ex-
isted in that jurisdiction. In any action brought under section 4(a) of
the Act, the Court concluded, it was "appropriate for a court to con-
sider whether a literacy or educational requirement has the 'effect
of denying . . the right to vote on account of race or color' because
the State or subdivision which seeks to impose the requirement has
maintained separate and inferior schools for its Negro residents who
are now of voting age."'' That a lack of educational opportunities
for Negroes was a national rather than a local phenomenon high-
lighted the discriminatory effect of the Gaston ruling, in Attorney
General Miller's estimation, and he cited numerous examples, based
on decisions of the Supreme Court and other federal sources, to prove
his point.'
Instead of amending the Act in light of the Gaston decision to
bring within its scope all states maintaining literacy tests in which
such disparities were found - i.e., all states with literacy tests - Con-
gress in 1970 suspended the use of all literacy tests throughout the
country. But Congress did so without compelling the other states
which had literacy tests, such as Massachusetts, Maine, New Hamp-
shire and Connecticut, to conform to the requirements of section 5,
thereby leaving intact the original discrimination against Virginia
and the other states singled out in the 1965 Act."' Virginia ap-
parently was denied relief from section 5 solely because of a pre-
158. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
159. I& at 293.
160. Summarizing these findings, the Virginia Attorney General noted the follow-
ing: (1) Unequal educational opportunity for blacks and whites, whether defined in
terms of literacy ability, school facilities and expenditures, or segregation, is not con-
fined to any region of the United States; (2) Blacks lag behind whites in literacy ability
and reading comprehension in each region of the nation; (3) A greater percentage of
blacks than whites was illiterate in each of the states which maintained literacy tests
in 1964 but which were not subjected to the proscriptions of section 5; (4) In each of
the literacy test states not subject to section 5 the percentage of black students more
than one year behind the school in 1950 exceeded the percentage of white students
more than one year behind by increasing margins; (5) A substantial portion of the
black students in each of the literacy test states not subject to section 5 in 1970 at-
tended majority black schools and schools in which 95 percent or more of the students
were black; and (6) Because of the educational disadvantages suffered by blacks, the
use of literacy tests in those states not subject to section 5 has a disproportionate im-
pact on blacks. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 32. at 821-22.
161. 1& at 828.
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existing lack of equal educational opportunities. Thus, the Voting
Rights Act suffers from basic inequities prejudicing not only Vir-
ginia but also jurisdictions like the City of Rome that are caught up
in seemingly irrebuttable presumptions over which they have no
control.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965:
SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
A. The Scope of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Question of
Original Intent
The Reconstruction Amendments, proposed and adopted be-
tween 1865 and 1870 in a period of profound civil unrest and political
turmoil,16 have surely introduced more uncertainty and confusion
into American law than all of the other provisions of the Constitu-
tion combined.'" Much of this uncertainty stems from the vagueness
of certain provisions in the amendments, and the conflicting inter-
pretations of their purpose and meaning offered by those who parti-
cipated in their creation. In his authoritative study of the question
whether the framers and backers of the fourteenth amendment in-
tended to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the word "liberty" of
the Due Process Clause, thereby making the first eight amendments
applicable to the states, Charles Fairman has warned that one
should not expect clarity and precision on all points in the historical
record. "We know so much more about the Constitutional law of the
Fourteenth Amendment than the men who adopted it," Fairman ob-
serves, "that we should remind ourselves not to be surprised to find
them vague where we want them to be sharp. Eighty years of ad-
judication has taught us distinctions and subtleties where the men
of 1866 did not even perceive the need for analysis." '' Adding to the
162. See generally C. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA (1929); J. BURGESS, RECONSTRUC-
TION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1902); E. McKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUC-
TION (1960); J. RANDALL. THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1937); K. STAMPP, THE
ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1865-1877 (1965).
163. One writer has estimated that the fourteenth amendment alone "is probably
the largest source of the Court's business, and furnishes the chief fulcrum for its con-
trol of controversial policies." R. BERGER, supra note 11, at 1.
164. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 9 (1949). "When one realizes how little
the men of 1866 foresaw the part the Supreme Court was going to play in working out
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of civil rights," Fairman further observes, "it
is no wonder that they did not fix their minds squarely on the question the court had
to face in 1873 and which is raised again today: what is the standard by which to test
state action alleged to violate the Fourteenth Amendment?" Il at 23-24.
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confusion and impeding understanding is the position taken by some
members of the modern Court that the original intent of the
framers, even when ascertained, is not binding on the Justices. Thus
in reply to Justice Harlan's exhaustive analysis of the historical
record in Oregon v. Mitchell, demonstrating convincingly that the
fourteenth amendment was never intended to "authorize Congress
to set voter qualifications, in either state or federal elections,"1 5
Justices Brennan, White and Marshall responded that they "could
not accept this thesis even if it were supported by historical evi-
dence."1" Justice Douglas dismissed Harlan's findings with the
assertion that they were simply "irrelevant."17 In the effort to clarify
the scope and purposes of the fifteenth amendment, therefore, one is
confronted not only with the problem of conflicting views among the
authors of the amendment, but also with a seeming indifference, if not
hostility, among certain members of the Court toward the original in-
tent of the framers even when that intent is known.
Since the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, the Court
has had numerous opportunities, beginning with South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,"' to examine the Act in the terms of the original intent
and understanding of those who framed the fifteenth amendment.
165. 400 U.S. at 154.
166. Id. at 251.
167. Id. at 140. Speaking for all of the members of the Court, Chief Justice Warren
announced in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489, 492 (1954), that "we can-
not turn back the clock to 1868" and summarily rejected evidence concerning the
original understanding of the equal protection clause as "inconclusive." See also
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (the Court is not confined
to historic notions of equality); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (evolving stan-
dards of decency define the substance of the eighth amendment). One of the earliest
calls for judicial legislation was that of J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
183-84 (1909, who suggested that the difficulty of the amending process gave courts
freedom of interpretation. See generally T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 14 (1969) (the original understanding must be "leavened" by "con-
sidered consensus"); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703 (1975) (the Court properly expounds upon national ideals not mentioned in the Con-
stitution); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27
U. CHI. L. REv. 661, 686 (1960) (the Supreme Court is the "national conscience" for the
American people). Such pronouncements are rarely encountered in the old reports,
which more uniformly reflect an attitude of deference toward the original intent of the
framers: In "the construction of the language of the Constitution .: .as indeed in all
other instances where construction becomes necessary, we are to place ourselves as
nearly as possible in the condition of the men who framed that instrument." Ex parte
Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
168. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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To what extent did the amendment, as originally conceived, con-
template federal regulation of suffrage? What powers, according to
the framers, did the amendment confer upon Congress under the
Enforcement Clause? Though such inquiries would seem to be a part
of the ordinary course of judicial decision-making, the Court has
never made them; and in City of Rome not even the City officials
raised these questions. Had the officials done so, the decision might
have produced a different result. At the very least, these questions
would have brought pressure upon the Court to justify its holdings
in the face of overwhelming evidence that the Voting Rights Act is
clearly inconsistent with the aims and purposes of the fifte nth
amendment.
Studies by historians, political scientists, and constitutional
scholars on the framing and adoption of the fifteenth amendment
have been readily available since the turn of the century, so the sub-
ject is hardly an arcane obscurity that would tax judicial resources.
Writing in 1909, John Mathews, a political scientist at Johns Hop-
kins University, concluded after examining the debates that "[u]nder
the Amendment as actually passed ... the power still remained with
the States to prescribe all qualifications which they had previously
been competent to prescribe, with the exception of the three named
in the Amendment."' This understanding was confirmed and con-
siderably broadened in 1965 by the historian, William Gillette,
whose carefully documented monograph has become the standard re-
ference on the origins of the fifteenth amendment.""
Debates in Congress on the amendment, extending from
January to February of 1869, were extensive and complex. These de-
bates involved many all-night sessions, produced incredibly compli-
cated parliamentary maneuvers and entanglements, and filled some
three hundred pages of the Congressional Globe. Passage of the
amendment, at times in doubt, was a victory for the moderates in
Congress, who were able to compromise the conflicting positions of
those who opposed Negro suffrage, and the radical Republicans who
wanted to federalize the electoral process. What was widely under-
stood in 1869 but was not generally realized in later years, until
Gillette's study appeared, was that the "primary goal" of the fif-
teenth amendment "was the enfranchisement of Negroes outside the
169. J. MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMEND-
MENT 44 (1909).
170. W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIF-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1965).
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deep South."'' Although the amendment would guarantee suffrage
to the newly emancipated slaves and protect them against future
disenfranchisement, many were already exercising the franchise-at
first under military reconstruction and later under new state con-
stitutions. The unenfranchised northern Negroes, on the other hand,
stood to benefit principally from the amendment, and would presum-
ably become loyal Republicans.'
In early January, various amendment proposals were offered to
protect the Negro voter by prohibiting literacy tests and poll taxes.
Some versions also sought to guarantee the right of Negroes to hold
public office. In time, however, these suggestions were abandoned
for lack of support, and the advocates of Negro suffrage were com-
pelled to settle for more modest gains. One of the first advocates to
come forward was Representative George Boutwell, a radical Re-
publican from Massachusetts, who introduced an amendment stipu-
lating that "'the right of any citizen of the United'States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State
by reason of race, color, or previous condition of slavery of any
citizen or class of citizens of the United States.'""" In competition
with Boutwell's proposal were amendments offered by the Ohio Re-
publican radical, Samuel Shellabarger, and his colleague, also from
Ohio, John Bingham. Shellabarger, a powerful advocate of Negro
rights, proposed to confer the right to vote on all males over the age
of twenty-one, except former rebels, and to abolish all state literacy
and property tests. Bingham's more moderate substitute favored the
idea of granting suffrage in both the Negroes and ex-confederates,
with a one-year residency requirement. All three amendments were
negative in the sense that they prohibited the states from exercis-
ing certain powers, and none sought to abolish primary control of
suffrage by the states. On January 30, the House rejected both the
Shellabarger and Bingham amendments, and passed the Boutwell
amendment with the necessary two-thirds majority.
Meanwhile, the Senate was considering an amendment proposed
by the Republican moderate from Nevada, William Stewart. Stewart
reluctantly endorsed Negro suffrage, but opposed Chinese suffrage.
Unlike Boutwell's proposal, Stewart's amendment was couched in af-
firmative language and guaranteed the right of the Negro to hold of-
fice. With the passage of the Boutwell amendment, the Senate drop-
ped Stewart's plan to consider the House version. During the course
of this protracted debate, the Senate also considered and rejected
171. Id at 46.
172. Id at 46-49.
173. Id. at 53 (citation omitted).
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an amendment introduced by Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan,
which specified "African suffrage" and left the states the power to
impose education and property tests to disenfranchise Negroes, and
yet another supirted by Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts
which sought to abolish all qualifications for either voting or holding
office because of "race, color, nativity, property, education or
religious belief."'"' But only hours after Wilson's amendment was
defeated on February 9, the Senate reversed course and adopted a
modified version which guaranteed the right to hold office, but did
not prohibit the states from setting qualifications for holding office.
Now seemingly in control, the radical Republicans quickly added a
proposed sixteenth amendment to reform the Electoral College and
sent the package to the House.
Led by Boutwell, the House rejected the Senate amendment and
requested a conference. Boutwell's cause was considerably strength-
ened now by the arch-radical Wendell Phillips, who actually favored
a guarantee of Negro officeholding but was willing to support the
Boutwell amendment because it was the only modest proposal that
had a chance of success. With the defeat of the more extreme Wil-
son plan, the Senate returned to the original amendment offered by
Senator Stewart, and on February 17 accepted it as preferable to
the moderate Boutwell version because Stewart's proposal contained
an officeholding provision. The House, however, rejected the
Stewart amendment in favor of Bingham's earlier proposal, and the
two houses appeared deadlocked.'
The stalemate was finally broken on February 24, however, by a
conference committee, which dropped demands for officeholding and
the ban on most suffrage tests, and recommended the Stewart
rather than the Bingham amendment. The amendment thus proposed
became the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution. The proposal
adopted was actually identical to Stewart's amendment in form, but
closely paralleled Boutwell's in substance. The Conference Commit-
tee deliberately omitted Negro officeholding and the proposed ban
on state literacy, property and nativity tests because the inclusion
of these factors might have jeopardized ratification. As Gillette has
correctly observed,
[tihis amendment was also a moderate one in that its wording
was negative. It did not give the federal government the right
to set up suffrage requirements, but left the fundamental right
with the states. Framed negatively, it did not directly confer the
174. Id. at 59'tcitation omitted).
175. Id. at 60-70.
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right of suffrage on anyone, and the negative wording might ob-
scure the major objective, which was to enfranchise the nor-
thern Negro. 7
Debate on the enforcement clause was largely avoided.
From this brief survey of the debates in the Fortieth Congress,
and "[bly the amendments offered and rejected, it is clear that the
framers did not intend to establish federal qualifications for suffrage
or to abolish the state literacy tests.""' Section 4(a) of the Voting
Rights Act, which suspends literacy tests where such tests have
been used to deny the right to vote on account of race would thus
seem to be directly contrary to the original intent of the framers of
the fifteenth amendment. A suspension or abolition of literacy tests,
in other words, would not be an "appropriate" means of enforcing
the amendment according to the understanding of the Fortieth Con-
gress. In a probative and detailed analysis of the debates on the
framing and adoption of the fifteenth amendment, which fully cor-
roborates Gillette's findings, one constitutional scholar has concluded
that "to abolish literacy tests is not an enforcement, but rather an
amendment of the Fifteenth Amendment, and is not authorized by
any constitutional power found in the national government.""' The
legislative history of the amendment clearly shows that the several
states are free to impose or to abolish such voter requirements as
literacy tests for any reason, "so long as these tests are applied
[equally] . . . to members of all races."'' The conclusion which
necessarily follows is that Congress may not exercise its enforce-
ment power to terminate such tests, and that section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act exceeds the constitutional power of Congress. Thus, one
may argue that the City of Rome cannot be subjected to the pre-
clearance provisions of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, as this re-
quirement is triggered by section 4, which is ultra vires and
therefore void.
B. The Scope of the Enforcement Power and the Question of
Original Intent
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, s° (Katzenbach I), when the
Supreme Court was first called upon to determine the constitu-
176. Id. at 71-72.
177. Id. at 72 n.108.
178. Avins. Literacy Teats and the Fifteenth Amendment: The Original
Understanding. 12 S. TEX. L.J. 24, 68 (1970).
179. Id. at 71.
180. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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tionality of the Voting Rights Act, the issue presented was whether
Congress had "exercised its powers under the fifteenth amendment
in an appropriate manner with relation to the States."'' In response
to South Carolina's contention that the Act exceeded the powers of
Congress and violated the rights of the states reserved by the tenth
amendment, Chief Justice Warren flatly stated that, "[ais against
the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational
means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimi-
nation in voting."'82 Warren did not offer an elaborate explanation of
this sweeping assertion of federal power, but the clear implication
was that federalism, in principle, did not operate as a limitation on
Congress' enforcement powers.
The rationality test, Warren further explained, was the one for-
mulated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland' in
connection with Congress' implied power to enact legislation that is
"necessary and proper" to carry into effect Congress' delegated
powers. Thus, Congress' power under section 2 of the fifteenth
181. Id. at 324.
182. Id.
183. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Is the "rational means" test of the Warren Court
an echo of the McCulloch test of the Marshall Court, as Warren seems. to claim? Mar-
shall did not speak of "rational" means, but of "appropriate" means. These he defined
as means which (1) "are plainly adapted" to a legitimate end, (2) "are not prohibited,"
and (3) are consistent "with the letter and spirit of the Constitution," Id at 420. Assuming
that federalism is in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Marshall's
test, at least on the face of it, would seem to suggest that a law which pursued a
legitimate end but violated the federal principle would be an inappropriate means to
that end. Moreover, section 2 of the fifteenth amendment requires that legislation
enacted by Congress be "appropriate," not "rational." The federal principle, in other
words, is most assuredly an ommipresent feature of the McCulloch test and a limiting
factor on the scope of Congress' powers, whether delegated or implied. That, at least,
is the effect of the decisions since 1819 and the meaning attached to McCulloch by
Marshall himself.
In a series of newspaper essays written in the summer of 1819 under the pseudonyms
"A Friend of the Union" and "A Friend of the Constitution," Chief Justice Marshall
endeavored to answer the critics of his opinion in McCulloch with the assurance that
the Necessary and Proper Clause did not enlarge the powers of the national govern-
ment. As Gerald Gunther has correctly observed,
His [Marshall's) essays and their context indicate that he did not view McCuUoch
as embracing extreme nationalism. The degree of centralization that has taken
place since his time may well have come about in the face of Marshall's intent
rather than in accord with his expectations .... [H]e did not believe that Congress
had an unrestricted choice of means to accomplish delegated ends .... Clearly
these essays give cause to be more guarded in invoking McCulloch to support a
view of Congressional power now thought necessary.
G. GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 20 (1969). See
also Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, SuP. C4. REv. 101 (1966).
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amendment, which grants Congress the right "to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation," could actually be read as a positive
grant of power "to make all laws that are necessary and proper" to
carry into effect the prohibition against racial discrimination in
voting. In other words, Congress' enforcement power under section
2 was both an enumerated and an implied power.
Warren then turned to sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act
to apply the McCulloch test. At the heart of section 4 is the assump-
tion that the remedial powers of Congress under the Enforcement
Clause extend to state practices which may be "remedied" by Con-
gress in the absence of a judicial declaration that such practices re-
quire a remedy. South Carolina objected to the suspension of its con-
stitutionally acceptable literacy test on the basis of Lassiter. v. Nor-
thampton County Bd. of Elections,'" which had held that literacy
tests were not in themselves contrary to the fifteenth amendment.
The members of the Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach were
unanimously agreed, however, that Congress had the right to sus-
pend these tests. Did this conclusion mean that Congress' enforce-
ment powers included not only the power to remedy existing defects
but also the power to declare, on Congress' authority alone, that a
defect existed where the Court had said there was none before?
Under section 4, Congress apparently was not remedying a defect in
response to a judicial decision, but was in fact deciding for itself
both the existence of a defect and the appropriate remedy.
Additionally, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act authorized Con-
gress to prohibit the states from adopting laws of their own choos-
ing, requiring states instead to enact measures acceptable to the At-
torney General or the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. The established principle that the states have the right
to enact their own electoral laws, good or bad, and await a judicial
determination of constitutionality was thus rejected. In effect, sec-
tion 5 imposed an affirmative duty on the states and their political
subdivisions to enact legislation conforming to guidelines laid down
by the federal government, and placed a single District Court in the
position of issuing advisory opinions on state proposed electoral
changes.
Chief Justice Warren conceded that "Itihis may have been an un-
common exercise of power."'" Instead of the McCulloch test,
however, Warren invoked the emergency doctrine of the BlaisdeU
184. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
185. 383 U.S. at 334.
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case'" and insisted that "the Court has recognized that exceptional
conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise ap-
propriate.""' 7 In this portion of the opinion Warren observed that
Congress "knew" that the states in the South would "resort to the
extraordinary strategem" of devising new laws to circumvent the
fifteenth amendment, and in anticipation of this event "Congress
responded in a permissibly decisive manner."'" Do "exceptional con-
ditions" create new legislative powers? And how can there be an
''exceptional condition" justifying this "uncommon exercise of
power" before the condition exists? The Chief Justice did not say.
Nor did Warren satisfactorily answer South Carolina's objection
that section 5 improperly required the District Court to issue ad-
visory opinions. A state wishing to make use of a change in its own
voting laws, Warren remarked, "has a concrete and immediate 'con-
troversy' with the Federal government."'"
Justice Black, the one dissenter,' objected strongly to the
Court's acceptance of section 5 of the Act as a valid exercise of Con-
gressional power. In the first place, Black argued, a mere "desire"
on the part of federal officials "to determine in advance what legisla-
tive provisions a state may enact""' was hardly the kind of dispute
that can give rise to a justiciable controversy. "By requiring a State
to ask a federal court to approve the validity of a proposed law
which has in no way become operative, Congress has asked the
State to secure precisely the type of advisory opinion our Constitu-
tion forbids."'"
Secondly, continued Black, section 5 was clearly in conflict with
186. Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Said the Court in
BlaiadeUl: "Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted
power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted .... " Id at
425. Warren also cited Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917), in support of his proposition.
But there the Court held that: "[A]Ithough an emergency may not call into life a power
which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of
a living power already enjoyed." 243 U.S. at 348. It is not entirely clear from the opin-
ion whether the "exceptional conditions" refer to past or future discriminatory prac-
tices. Do any "exceptional conditions" warrant Congressional usurpation of state power
under the emergency doctrine?
187. 383 U.S. at 334.
188. Id. at 335.
189. Id.
190. Black agreed with the Court's holding that section 2 of the fifteenth amend-
ment permitted Congress to suspend state literacy tests, but apparently not on the
basis of the emergency doctrine. 383 U.S. at 355-56 (Black, J., dissenting).
191. d. at 357.
192. Id. at 357-58.
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the McCulloch test, which limits the enforcement powers of Con-
gress to legislation that is not prohibited by the Constitution and is
consistent with its letter and spirit: 3
Certainly if all the provisions of our Constitution which limit the
power of the Federal Government and reserve other power to
the States are to mean anything, they mean at least that the
States have power to pass laws .. .without first sending their
officials hundreds of miles away to beg federal authorities to ap-
prove them.'"
By prohibiting the states from enacting legislation without the con-
sent of federal authorities, section 5 actually provided for a Congres-
sional veto of state laws, a power that was considered and specifically
rejected by the Founding Fathers in 1787." "The judicial power to
invalidate a law in a case or controversy after the law has become
effective," concluded Black, "is a long way from the power to pre-
vent a State from passing a law. I cannot agree with the Court that
Congress, denied a power in itself to veto a state law, can delegate
this same power to the Attorney General or the District Court for
the District of Columbia."'" Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
reduced the states to "little more than conquered provinces."''
According to Justice Black, then, the enforcement powers of
Congress, denied a power in itself to veto a state law, can delegate
mandates of the Constitution, and in particular by the federal princi-
ple. The test of constitutionality, he implied, was not the emergency
doctrine, as the Court seemed to think, but McCulloch. As a general
principle, Black indicated, "appropriate legislation" under section 2
of the fifteenth amendment is that which conforms to the letter and
spirit of the Constitution and is not prohibited, either explicitly or
implicitly, by the Constitution. Why this test resulted in acceptance
of section 4 of the Act and the rejection of section 5, Black did not
explain. But his reading of the Enforcement Clause seemed to in-
dicate that Congress enjoys a broad power "to protect this right to
193. Id. at 358.
194. Id. at 359. Black also contended that section 5 violated the Guarantee Clause
of the Constitution. Id.
195. Such a proposal was presented by the Governor of Virginia, Edmund Ran-
dolph, in the Virginia Plan. "The proceedings of the original Constitutional
Convention," noted Black, "show beyond all doubt that the power to veto or negative
state laws was denied Congress." Id. at 360. See also Justice Black's remarks, id. at
361, n.3.
196. Id at 361.
197. Id. at 360.
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vote against any method of abridgement no matter how subtle,"'"
short of protection by means of a Congressional veto.
In subsequent cases involving the enforcement clauses of the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, the Court has continued to
render broad interpretations of Congress' remedial powers. In Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan'" (Katzenbach II) and in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 0 for example, the Court upheld sweeping federal legisla-
tion on the basis of Congress' powers "to enforce" the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, without venturing to define, except in summary
fashion, the range of Congress' enforcement powers. City of Rome is
no exception. The Court has made no investigative effort to deter-
mine the original intent of the enforcement clauses, and has yet to
shed any light on the issue. As a result, Congress is presently in
possession of inchoate powers under all of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments. Barring a reversal of these decisions, which seems unlikely
at this time, Congress has already acquired substantial new powers
under the enforcement clauses at the expense of the states. How
far Congress will be permitted to extend its powers in this direction
and the extent to which the Court will permit Congress to define
both the substantive content of the amendments and Congress'
powers under them are the principal questions that remain unan-
swered.
Nevertheless, many students of the Constitution, particularly
those who have worked their way through the farrago of opinions
(i.e., Katzenbach I, II and Jones), are in agreement that these deci-
sions and their progeny have produced a constitutional thicket of
tangled precedents and conflicting interpretations that make it
almost impossible to speak with any degree of confidence or certainty
about the scope and meaning of Congressional power under the en-
forcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments. Oregon v.
Mitchell, for example, which offers five different interpretations of
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,
has been described by one commentator as a "constitutional law di-
saster area." ''
In view of these difficulties, as well as the perennial problems
associated with the interpretation of the Reconstruction Amend-
198. Id. at 355.
199. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
200. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
201. Cohen. Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection,
27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 609 (1975).
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ments, one is astonished to find that no one-not a single member of
the Court or any of the commentators-has inquired about the ori-
ginal intent of those who drafted the enforcement clauses. Congres-
sional debates and legislative interpretations are not always com-
pletely reliable sources of understanding, of course, owing to the
nature of the political process and the constitutional insufficiency of
many participants. But a study of such debates, from the perspec-
tive of what was said and what was not said, can often clarify the
meaning of a word or clause, thereby facilitating the task of judicial
construction.
The enforcement clauses were only casually debated when the
Reconstruction Amendments were proposed and adopted .2 1 In fact,
the meaning and purpose of the enforcement powers of Congress
under the amendments were not subjected to a searching analysis
until 1871, when Congress considered the Ku Klux Klan Act. The
Ku Klux Klan Act was, to be sure, "the most extensive Congres-
sional attempt during reconstruction to prevent racial and political
crimes of violence pursuant to the fifth section of the fourteenth
amendment.""3 These debates, which consumed nearly the entire
first session of the Forty-second Congress, offer the most fruitful
source of understanding regarding Congress' intended role in guar-
anteeing the protection of civil rights. Most of the Senators and
Congressmen who actively participated in the debates on the Ku
Klux Klan Act had also taken part in the drafting of the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments. These spokesmen addressed their remarks to all
three amendments, weighed their words carefully, and were con-
scious of the fact that they were making legislative and constitutional
history.
"I hope you gentlemen will bear in mind," said one legislator,
"that this debate, in which so many have taken part, will become
historical, as the earliest legislative construction given to this clause
[section 5] of the amendment."' He went on to declare that "not only
202. One of the few studies on this subject is R. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY
(1960), which deals in part with the debates on section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
at the time of adoption. As Harris notes,
it is difficult to ascertain from the debates the specific purposes of the first sec-
tion coupled with the fifth. The greater portions of the debates over the submis-
sion of the Fourteenth Amendment centered about the representation and suf-
frage provisions in Section 2 and the device for disfranchising former Con-
federates in Section 3.
Id. at 35.
203. Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. LOUIS L.J. 331, 331-32 (1967).
204. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 150 (1871) (hereinafter cited as GLOBEI.
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the words which we have put into law, but what shall be said here
in the way of defining and interpreting the meaning of the clause,
may go far to settle its interpretation and its value to the
country."210 These were the words of the Republican Representative
from Ohio, James A. Garfield, who would later serve as the twen-
tieth President of the United States. First elected to the Thirty-
eighth Congress, in 1863, he was a staunch supporter of the Recon-
struction Amendments. As Harris correctly observes, Garfield's
perceptive address on the enforcement powers of Congress under
the fourteenth amendment was "the most significant speech of the
debate . 2.0.""
Although a full and complete analysis of the House and Senate
debates on the Ku Klux Klan Act is beyond the scope of this paper,
it is nevertheless possible to pinpoint the principal issues, and distill
the general themes of Congressional power presented by the partici-
pants. Garfield's hour long speech on April 4, 1871, is especially
significant in a number of ways. First, this speech served as a focal
point of discussion in the House of Representatives, where the issue
of enforcement was more extensively debated. Senate debate on the
Ku Klux Klan bill was not as thorough, owing to the distracting in-
fluence of John Sherman's resolution calling for a bill to suppress
disorders in the South."°0
Second, Garfield was one of the most informed members of the
House on the subject. Not only had he personally taken a part in the
framing and adoption of the fourteenth amendment, but he had also
studied carefully the debates in Congress and the constitutional
issues that had arisen under the Reconstruction Amendments. The
introductory part of Garfield's well-prepared address, amply sup-
ported by references to earlier debates, Supreme Court cases, and
the works of such eminent authorities as Madison, Kent and Story,
covered both the constitutional history of civil rights litigation
before the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments and the
legislative history since the introduction of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Quoting frequently from the debates on the consideration of
the fourteenth amendment, Garfield led his colleagues, step by step,
through the process of adoption in an effort to determine the intended
and proper relationship between the first and fifth sections of the
fourteenth amendment. He also invited the comments of his col-
leagues concerning the accuracy of his interpretations as he pro-
205. Id.
206. R. HARRIS, supra note 202, at 47.
207. Id. at 49.
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ceeded toward his conclusion that the Ku Klux Klan Act, as in-
troduced, was unconstitutional.
Third, a number of key legislators who had also participated in
the drafting of the fourteenth amendment were present at the time
Garfield delivered this speech, including the confused and conten-
tious author of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, Represen-
tative John Bingham of Ohio, and Representative Samuel Shellabar-
ger, another Ohio Republican and the sponsor of the Ku Klux Klan
bill. Significantly, Bingham was the only member of the House who
took issue with any of the points raised by Garfield. Moreover, not
one member spoke in support of Bingham, suggesting that Bingham's
views on section 5 may not have been representative of a very large
segment of opinion in the House.
Garfield began by extolling the virtues of local self-government,
correctly pointing out "that before the adoption of the last three
amendments it was the settled interpretation of the Constitution
that the protection of the life and property of private citizens within
the States belonged to the State governments exclusively." ' This
principle could be traced back to the Federalist 45, '0 which Bingham
had quoted approvingly, Garfield noted, when the fourteenth amend-
ment was under consideration. 10 When the Civil Rights Act of 1866
was debated, Garfield continued, Bingham repeatedly endorsed this
principle, as did Shellabarger, who assured his colleagues that the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not "reach mere private wrongs, but only
those done under color of State authority. . . .It meant, therefore,
not to usurp the powers of the States to punish offenses generally
against the rights of citizens in the several States. .. .
To what extent did the Reconstruction Amendments alter the
states' exclusive control over civil liberties? Garfield's answer
reflected the widespread uncertainty among the members as to the
precise effect of the new amendments on the powers of Congress.
Garfield could only say that the Reconstruction Amendments had
"modified the Constitution," and that "Ithey have to some extent
208. GLOBE, supra note 204, at app. 150.
209. "The powers reserved to the several States," said Madison, the author of this
essay, "will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern
the lives, liberties, and properties of the people. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citation omitted). Garfield also quoted Representative Delano (R.-Ohio),
who in the same debate remarked that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 "was never designed
to take away from the States the right of controlling their citizens in respect to prop-
erty, liberty and life." Id. at app. 150.
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enlarged the functions of Congress and, within prescribed limits,
have extended its jurisdiction within the States."2 ' Focusing on sec-
tion 1 of the fourteenth amendment, Garfield reminded his col-
leagues that Bingham's original proposal of January 12, 1866, which
the House rejected and the Senate never debated at all," 3 provided
that "Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and pro-
per to secure to all persons in every State within the Union equal
protection in their rights of life, liberty, and property."" ' Had this
first draft been adopted, said Garfield, it would have brought about
a "radical change in the Constitution" by empowering "Congress to
legislate directly upon the citizens of all the States in regard to
their rights of life, liberty, and property."2"5 in effect, Bingham's pro-
posal would have nullified Barron v. Baltimore" and abolished the
primary jurisdiction of the States over civil liberties. Garfield's
point-a highly significant one-was abundantly clear: Congress' re-
jection of Bingham's original proposal in favor of the more restric-
tive language of section 1, which was a prohibition against the
states rather than a grant of power to Congress, indicated that the
framers intended to limit the scope of Congressional power under
the fourteenth amendment by the federal principle, and to carve out
an exception to the principle in Barron, not to overturn that princi-
ple. Comparing Bingham's rejected proposal with the first and fifth
sections of the amendment as adopted, Garfield noted that the latter
'"exerts its force directly upon the States, laying restrictions and
limitations upon their power and enabling Congress to enforce these
limitations."2 " The theory of Congressional power which was re-
jected with Bingham's proposal, on the other hand,
would have brought the power of Congress to bear directly upon
the citizens, and contained a clear grant of power to Congress to
legislate directly for the protection of life, liberty and property
within the States. The first limited but did not oust the jurisdic-
212. Id. at app. 150.
213. Id. at app. 151. Garfield had stated that Bingham's measure was "recommit-
ted" to the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, to which Bingham replied
that Garfield was "mistaken" because it had merely been postponed. Technically,
Bingham was correct, Garfield agreed, but there was no doubt in anyone's mind that
Bingham's original proposal "could not command a two-thirds vote of Congress, and for
that reason the proposition was virtually withdrawn. Its consideration was postponed
February 28 by a vote of 110 to 37." Id.
214. Id. at app. 150.
215. Id. at app. 151.
216. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
217. GLOBE, supra note 204, at app. 151 (emphasis added).
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tion of the State over these subjects. The second gave Congress
plenary power to cover the whole subject with its jurisdiction,
and, as it seems to me, to the exclusion of the State authorities."8
This understanding was further supported, continued Garfield,
by the late Radical Republican from Pennsylvania, Thad Stevens,
the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction in 1866 who
reported the amendment in its final form. Stevens complained at the
time, noted Garfield, that the amendment "'came far short of what
he wished."" Interrupting Garfield at this point, Bingham rose to
object, erroneously asserting that "[tihe remark of Mr. Stevens had
no relation whatever to the provision ... ."I" But Garfield had all of
the documents at hand. He quickly responded by quoting Stevens at
length, with the admonishment that Bingham could "make but he
cannot unmake history. I not only heard the whole debate at the
time, but I have lately read over, with scrupulous care, every word
of it recorded in the Globe.1 2 1 Informing members that the wording
of the fourteenth amendment was the result of a compromise worked
out in the Joint Committee, Stevens had stated: "'The proposition is
not all that the Committee desired. It falls far short of my hopes....
[Tihe Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and it is not a
limitation on the States. This amendment supplies [corrects?] that
defect and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the
States. . ."'I Although Garfield did not elaborate further on the
point, implicit in Stevens' statement to the members of the House
was the recognition of a state action requirement in the amendment,
and the grudging acceptance of the federal principle. According to
Stevens, the power of Congress under the fourteenth amendment
was not primary but corrective, and the object of Congressional
legislation was not private discrimination but "the unjust legislation
of the States."
Stevens' interpretation of section 1 of the amendment, continued
Garfield, "was the one followed by almost every Republican who
spoke on the measure. It was throughout the debate, with scarcely
an exception, spoken of as a limitation of the power of the States to
legislate unequally for the protection of life and property."2" Indeed,
Representation John Farnsworth of Illinois, a prominent figure in
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. (emphasis added). Garfield could find only two House members, Shankling
of Kentucky and Rogers of New Jersey (both Democrats opposed to the amendment)
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the debates, had "said that the first section might as well be reduc-
ed to these words: 'No State shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . .. ""'
Thus, Garfield understood that the dominant theme of the
amendment was the equal protection of the laws and not due pro-
cess or the privileges and immunities of citizenship. This view, it
should be noted, is fairly consistent with Harris' reading of the de-
bates on the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. "A common
theme of the discussion by the amendment's supporters," Harris ob-
serves, "was the mutual interdependence of the privileges and im-
munities, due process, and equal protection clauses, in contrast to
the later practice of constitutional lawyers and historians of regard-
ing the clauses as separate and independent. To Bingham, Jacob
-Howard and their cohorts ... equality was an essential part of liber-
ty. '  This interpretation of section 1, if correct, would, of course,
narrow considerably further the scope of Congress' power to enforce
the amendment as well as the scope of judicial review, since federal
intervention into the affairs of the states respecting civil liberties
would be limited to those instances where the states had legislated
"unequally for the protection of life and liberty," and would not ex-
tend to cases where substantive rights had been curtailed or denied
to all persons equally.
Turning to the enforcement clause itself, Garfield asserted that
this clause empowered Congress to enforce the new guarantees in
two ways. First, the enforcement clause gave Congress the power to
enact legislation granting federal courts jurisdiction over disputes
"where every law, ordinance, usage, or decree of any State in con-
flict with these provisions may be declared unconstitutional and
void."' Believing that the courts rather than Congress would be the
principle enforcer of the amendment, Garfield also expressed the
view that "It]his great remedy [of conferring jurisdiction] covers
nearly all the ground that needs to be covered in time of peace."2
Pointing to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Enforcement Act of
who thought section 1 placed "the protection of the fundamental rights of life and prop-
erty directly in the control of Congress," and their assaults against the amendment
"were general and sweeping charges, not sustained even by specific statement." Id.
224. Id The Due Process Clause, said Garfield, meant simply that each state was
required to provide "an impartial trial according to the laws of the land." Id at app.
153.
225. R. HARRIS, supra note 202, at 35-36.
226. GLOBE. supra note 204, at app. 153.
227. ld.
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1870, Garfield further noted that "this ground has already been
covered, to a great extent, by the legislation of Congress." m
Secondly, Congress had the power to enact legislation "for the
punishment of all persons, official or private, who shall invade these
rights, and who by violence, threats, or intimidation shall deprive
any citizen of their fullest enjoyment. This is a part of that general
power vested in Congress to punish the violators of its laws."' As
for the outrages being perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan, which
were the concern of the legislation under consideration, Garfield had
"no doubt of the power of Congress to provide for meeting this new
danger, and to do so without trenching upon those great and benefi-
cent powers of local self-government lodged in the States and with
the people."nm
Unfortunately, Garfield's interpretation of Congress' power of
enforcement at this crucial point of his analysis was not entirely
clear. Apparently, Garfield was distinguishing between the power of
Congress to prohibit the states from interfering with the rights pro-
tected under the amendment, which rested on section 5, and the
power of Congress to provide for the punishment of individuals who
violated those rights, which was based on "that general power
vested in Congress to punish the violators of its laws." A cursory
reading of his statement that this general power authorized Con-
gress to enact legislation "for the punishment of all persons, official
or private" suggests that Garfield may also have believed that Con-
gress had the power to punish ordinary offenses by one individual
against another. As will become evident from his objections to the se-
cond section of the proposed Ku Klux Klan Bill, however, and his posi-
tion on the Cook-Shellabarger amendment to that section, Garfield ap-
parently believed that Congress' authority to punish private of-
fenses was limited to private acts of interference with state officials
in their attempts to carry out constitutional duties imposed by
federal statute.
Garfield had no quarrel with the first section of the Ku Klux
Klan bill, which provided that any person who, under the color of a
state law, deprived another of his rights under the Constitution,
would be liable for an action of redress in the federal courts. "This,"
he asserted, "is a wise and salutary provision, and plainly within the
power of Congress.""2 ' Indeed, said Garfield, Congress was even em-
228. Ild.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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powered to remedy injustice in those instances "where the laws are
just and equal on their face, yet by a systematic maladministration
of them, or neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion
of the people are denied equal protection under them.""s
But the second section of the bill, which a number of Republi-
cans and Democrats had vigorously attacked in earlier debates,'
presented a serious difficulty for Garfield. This second section was
not directed at state action, but instead, provided civil and criminal
penalties for such private conspiratorial acts as "murder, man-
slaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury, suborna-
tion of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal process or resistance of
officers in discharge of official duty, arson, or larceny" that were
committed "in violation of the rights, privileges or immunities of
any person, to which he is entitled under the Constitution and laws
232. Id.
233. In a major address on the scope of Congress' enforcement power, the Illinois
Republican John Farnsworth denounced the second section as an unconstitutional usur-
pation of state authority. Quoting from the debates on the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, Farnsworth cited a number of Senators and Congressmen, including Thad
Stevens, for the proposition that the amendment never "gave any power to Congress
to legislation except to correct this unjust legislation of the States." Id. at app. 116. In
essence, Farnsworth noted, the second section of the Ku Klux Klan bill simply punished
murder and other crimes in derogation of state criminal jurisdiction. See also
Representative Burchard's analysis in note 192, supra. In reply to Shellabarger's asser-
tion that it only punished conspiracies to violate constitutional rights, Farnsworth
observed that the inclusion of conspiracy did not correct the problem, since if Congress
could punish a conspiracy it would also punish the same act done individually. GLOBE,
supra note 204, at app. 113. Garfield, who was on the floor at the time Farnsworth and
Shellabarger were engaged in this colloquy over the constitutionality of the second
section, spoke up in support of Farnsworth, stating that there were only two members
of the House in 1866, Shankland and Rogers, who thought that Congress had the
authority that was now being claimed under the second section of the Ku Klux Klan
bill. GLOBE, supra note 204, at app. 116.
Farnsworth was a veteran of the House. He had served as a Union general during
the War and had avidly supported the fourteenth amendment. In a remarkable confes-
sion, he urged the members to exercise constitutional restraint, now that the war was
over:
I have given votes and done things during my twelve years service in the House
of Representatives which I cannot defend .... I know we have done things during
the war and during the process of reconstruction to save the public which could
not be defended if done in peace .... We passed laws, Mr. Speaker, and the coun-
try knows it, which we did not like to go to the Supreme Court for adjudication.
And I am telling no tales out of school.... Sir, we have done some things under
the necessity of the case ... which may be a little beyond the verge of the Con-
stitutional power possessed by Congress in time of peace. But, sir, this is not the
time to overstep those bounds.
GLOBE, supra note 204, at app. 116.
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of the United States."' Accordingly, Garfield argued that this sec-
tion of the bill needed to be amended in such a way that it would
"employ no terms which assert the power of Congress to take juris-
diction of the subject until such denial [of equal protection] be clearly
made, and [would) not in any way assume the original jurisdiction of
the rights of private persons and of property within the States...."2
Likewise, Garfield believed that the third section of the bill was
in need of repair because it seemed to propose that citizens be
punished for violating state laws. "If this be the meaning of the pro-
vision," said Garfield, "then whenever any person violates a State
law the United States may assume jurisdiction of his offense. This
would virtually abolish the administration of justice under State
law." 13' Garfield assured his colleagues that if these changes in the
second and third sections of the bill were made, he would withdraw
his objections to the bill and give it his support.
Representative Shellabarger, in response to Garfield's lengthy
address, attempted to summarize Garfield's position as follows:
I understand that the effect of what he [Garfield] says is, that as
the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitu-
tion is a negation upon the power of the States, and that as the
fifth section of that amendment only authorizes Congress to en-
force the provisions thereof, therefore Congress has no power by
direct legislation to secure the privileges and immunities of citi-
zenship, because the provision in each section is in the form of a
mere negation.27
While this short summary was an essentially accurate description of
Garfield's interpretation, Shellabarger merely touched on one aspect
of it. In Garfield's mind, the overarching principle structuring the
234. GLoBE. supra note 204, at app. 113.
235. Id. at app. 153.
236. Id. at app. 154.
237. Id. at app. 153. Shellabarger did not explain the nature of his disagreement
with Garfield on this point, if any, but he wondered how Garfield could justify his vote
on recently enacted legislation under the fifteenth amendment which declared "who
shall vote at township and every other election," and then "punishes the man who
deprives anyone of the right to vote, which he gets under Federal law, and in contra-
vention of the constitutions of one half of the States," if Congress could not secure the
right to vote by direct legislation. Id. at app. 154. Garfield replied that "[ilf the case
stands in all respects exactly as my colleague [Shellabarger) puts it, it might push me
to the conclusion that some of the provisions of the enforcement act are unconstitu-
tional." But Garfield did not accept either the premise or the conclusion because Con-
gress' power to regulate the time, place and manner of elections "carried with it the
whole question of suffrage." Id.
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enforcement power of Congress under the fourteenth amendment
was federalism. His assumption-an appealing one-was that the
framers of the amendments, among which' he included himself, had
never intended to uproot the basic design of the Constitution by
transferring primary control over civil liberties from the states to
the national government.
Garfield found support for this assumption in Congress' rejec-
tion of Bingham's original draft, which would have conferred direct
authority on Congress to define the substance of due process and
equal protection, and in the wording of section 1, which gave Con-
gress only a narrow power to enforce a prohibition. Congress' en-
forcement power was necessarily corrective in nature, therefore,
since Congress could not act "until such denial of equal protection
be clearly made," that is, until the states had denied the guarantees
of the amendment. This approach would seem to require some sort
of prior determination that such a denial had occurred before Con-
gress could step in and remedy the defect. Whether Garfield had a
judicial determination in mind is not certain, although he did in-
dicate in explaining his opposition to the Ku Klux Klan Act that
"Congress . . . [may not] take jurisdiction of the subject until such
denial be clearly made."u'
Finally, on the question of state action, Garfield took the posi-
tion that Congress' enforcement power was limited to remedying
defects in state laws, "a systematic maladministration of them, or a
neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions."' " Did this rule out
the possibility of Congressional intervention in the absence of state
laws, where the states had simply failed to pass any law and when
there were no state statutory provisions to enforce in the first
place? This limitation on the power of Congress would seem to be
Garfield's understanding, although once again his remarks are not
free of uncertainty. Still, Garfield did not doubt that Congress lacked
the power under the fourteenth amendment to prescribe punish-
ments for persons who violated state laws. Punitive measures against
those who violated federal laws were appropriate, however, under
the general powers of the federal government.
But Garfield, as well as nearly all the other Republicans in the
House, also believed that the reach of Congressional enforcement
power did not extend to offenses committed by one private in-
238. Id.
239. Id.
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dividual against another.4 0 Confronting this reality, Shellabarger,
the sponsor of the Ku Klux Klan bill, subsequently amended the con-
troversial second section of his proposal, upon the suggestion of Re-
presentative Burton Cook, an Illinois Republican lawyer. As modi-
fied, section 2 of the bill was restricted to conspiracies to deprive
any person of the equal protection of the laws or equal privileges
and immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing
state authorities from securing equal protection to all persons or in-
juring them for enforcing equal protection."'
In explaining the constitutional theory behind the Cook-Shella-
barger amendment, Cook declared that a
combination of men by force and intimidation, or threat to pre-
vent the Governor of a State ...[from securing aid] to protect
the rights of all citizens alike, or to induce the Legislature of a
State by unlawful means to deprive citizens of the equal protec-
tion of the laws, or to induce the courts to deny citizens the
equal protection of the laws ...is the offense against the Con-
stitution of the United States, and may be defined and punished
by national law. And that, sir, is the distinct principle upon
which this bill is founded." '
In brief, the Cook-Shellabarger amendment, as Alfred Avins has
noted in his detailed analysis of the debates on the Ku Klux Klan
Act concerning the issue of state action, "punished only conspiracies
to obstruct state officials in performing their constitutional duty of
affording all persons equal protection. It did not punish conspiracies
240. Representative Horatio Burchard, an Illinois Republican lawyer, spoke for
most of his House colleagues when he stated that Shellabarger's first draft of the sec-
ond section of the Ku Klux Klan Bill was an unconstitutional invasion of exclusive
state criminal jurisdiction. On the other hand,
(wlhat more appropriate legislation for enforcing a constitutional prohibition
upon a State than to compel State officers to observe it? Its violations by the
State can only be consummated through the officers by whom it acts. May it not
then equally punish the illegal attempts of private individuals to prevent the per-
formance of official duties in the manner required by the Constitution and laws of
the United States?
Id. at app. 314. See the remarks of the Republican from Vermont, Representative Luke
Poland, who was a member of the Senate in 1866 and a supporter of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at app. 514. See also the statement of Republican Senator Lyman
Trumbull of Illinois, the veteran Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, who
avowed that he was "not willing to undertake to enter the States for the purpose of
punishing individual offenses against their authority committed by one citizen against
another." Id. at app. 577-78.
241. Id. at app. 477-78.
242. Id. at app. 486.
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to commit crimes against individuals, even if such crimes were moti-
vated by a desire to deprive them of equal protection.""' The Cook-
Shellabarger amendment was adopted along with a few additional
amendments of lesser significance, and the bill passed the House on
a party-line vote of 118 to 91, with such critics of the first draft as
Farnsworth and Garfield voting in favor of the bil.""
Senator Allen Thurman, an Ohio Democrat who had opposed the
bill, proved to be right, however, that the second section of the Act
was too vaguely worded. In United States v. Harris,5 the Supreme
Court declared that a section of revised statutes derived from the
second section of the Ku Klux Klan Act was unconstitutional. "As,
therefore, the section of the law under consideration is directed ex-
clusively against the action of private persons," said the Court,
"without reference to the laws of the State or their administration
by her officers, we are clear in the opinion that it is not warranted
by any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."",6
In other words, the Court, apparently unaware of the intent of the
Act, invalidated section 2 precisely on the grounds Garfield and
others had criticized Shellabarger's first draft. "[Although the
theory ultimately adopted was that the violence would have to
direct its force against a public official to deter him or prevent him
from affording protection, the statutory language did not make this
clear, but instead proscribed conspiracies to deny protection
generally." ' Thus, as Avins astutely observes, "It]he anti-Klan
statute was not a Congressional excursion into unconstitutional ter-
ritory, but was merely the victim of poor legislative drafting." '
In the final analysis, poor draftsmanship may also explain the
243. Avins, supra note 203, at 353.
244. GLOBE, supra note 204, at app. 522. The vote for final passage in the Senate
was also based on party alignment: 36 to 13. Id. at app. 831.
245. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
246. d. at 639-40.
247. Avins, supra note 203, at 379.
248. Id. Avins notes that in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966),
one opinion of Justices Clark, Black and Fortas, and another of Justices Brennan,
Douglas and the Chief Justice, held that the federal government, under the Fifth
section of the fourteenth amendment, could punish private conspiracies or private
violence designed to interfere with the exercise of rights under the first section of
the amendment, regardless of what state officials may or may not do. This is the
precise theory which in 1871 was disavowed by every Republican who voted for
the fourteenth amendment .... It is nothing more than the creation by Congress
of a general criminal code, providing only that an intent is present to deprive a
man of his fourteenth amendment rights.
Id. at 381.
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endless confusion and controversy that have traditionally accom-
panied the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments.
That the members of the Reconstruction Congresses and the
Supreme Court have expressed so many divergent points of view on
the enforcement powers of Congress suggests the presence of a
fundamental flaw in the design. In reading over the debates on the
Ku Klux Klan Act, for example, one senses a feeling of frustration
among the members of Congress, many of whom participated in the
drafting of the amendments but seem unable to articulate in a clear
and precise manner Congress' role under them. At least three
separate and distinct theories of congressional power were defended
by the members of the Forty-second Congress, ' and even a skilled
lawyer such as James A. Garfield, who obviously studied the issue
with great care, experienced difficulty in weaving the principle of
congressional enforcement into the fabric of the Constitution.
Under the original Constitution, the powers of Congress are ex-
pressed as affirmative grants of power to carry out stated objec-
tives. In general, these are powers which were delegated to Con-
gress by the states. Most of them are enumerated in article I, sec-
tion 8 of the Constitution. This section of the Constitution also
authorized Congress to pass all laws which are necessary and proper
to carry into execution both the enumerated powers in article I, sec-
tion 8 "and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." These are the implied powers of Congress.
Article I, section 10, on the other hand, deals with powers that
are denied to the states, and in effect declares that the states did
not reserve certain specified powers such as the power to enter into
a treaty, pass a bill of attainder, or impair the obligation of con-
tracts. No implication has ever been seriously considered that these
prohibitions against the states simultaneously conferred any power
on Congress to define or enforce the prohibitions. In fact, the Presi-
dent has the power to make treaties and Congress itself is pro-
hibited under article I, section 9 from passing a bill of attainder. Only
the courts, therefore, may enforce the prohibitions against the
states that are contained in article I, section 10.
Like article I, section 10, the fourteenth amendment is als6 a
prohibition against the states; but unlike that article, the amend-
ment empowers Congress to enforce the prohibition. In this respect,
the fourteenth amendment represents a radical departure from the
249. R. HARRIS, aupra note 202, at 45.
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basic design of the Constitution, since the amendment authorizes
Congress, concurrently with the courts, to enforce certain restric-
tions against the states. Thus, an inherent problem of separation of
powers and conflict between the courts and Congress is built into
the amendment, in that the fundamental power to enforce, which is
not a legislative power, is conferred on the legislature. Indeed, the
power to enforce the Constitution is actually an executive power,
although the courts accomplish this same end indirectly through
their power to interpret and apply constitutional provisions. In sum,
the fourteenth amendment introduces an'alien principle into the
Constitution that is wholly inconsistent with the basic system of
separation of powers upon which the Constitution is built.
These difficulties become all the more perplexing when one con-
siders the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments, which are prohibi-
tions against the states and the national government. The fifteenth
amendment, for example, declares that "[tlhe right ... to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State .... ,"
and .then stipulates that Congress is empowered to enforce the pro-
hibition. In other words, the amendment empowers Congress, to en-
force a prohibition against itself. No historical evidence exists to
support the assumption that the framers of the fifteenth amendment
intended for Congress to be the final interpreter of its own powers,
in derogation of the principles of separation of powers and judicial
review. The wording of the amendment, however, seems to invite
such an interpretation.
In the Civil Rights Cases,1w0 Justice Bradley attempted to
resolve these incongruities by reverting to the basic principles of
the Constitution. Bradley observed that:
(where] Congress is clothed with direct and plenary powers of
legislation over the whole subject, accompanied with an express
or implied denial of such power to the States, as in the regula-
tion of commerce with foreign nations, among the several States
•.. Congress has power to pass laws for regulating the subjects
specified in every detail .... But where a subject is not submit-
ted to the general legislative power of Congress, but is only sub-
mitted thereto for the purpose of rendering effective some pro-
hibition against particular State legislation or State action in
reference to that subject, the power given is limited by its ob-
ject, and any legislation by Congress in the matter must neces-
sarily be corrective in its character, adapted to counteract and
250. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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redress the operation of such prohibited State laws or pro-
ceedings of State officers." " '
Lacking a general and hence an implied power under the Enforce-
ment Clause of the fourteenth amendment, the application of the
McCulloch test to acts of Congress to determine their legitimacy
would seem to be an improper rule of measurement since the scope
of the enforcement power is far more limited than that of a dele-
gated power under article 1, section 8. But these distinctions offered
by Justice Bradley in 1883 have not been repeated and seem to have
been forgotten by the modern Court.
Early in the debates on the Ku Klux Klan Act, John Bingham, in
his colloquy with Congressman Farnsworth concerning the signifi-
cance of Congress' rejection of his first draft of section 1 of the four-
teenth amendment, explained that he redesigned the amendment to
place it in conformity with Barron v. Baltimore."2 In re-examining
the case of Bar-on, said Bingham,
after my struggle in the House in February 1866 ... I noted and
apprehended as I never did before, certain words in that opinion
of Marshall. Referring to the first eight articles of amendments
to the Constitution of the United States, the Chief Justice said:
"Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be
limitations on the powers of the State governments they would
have imitated the framers of the original Constitution and have
expressed that intention."In
Continuing, Bingham revealed that:
Acting upon this suggestion I did imitate the framers of the
original constitution. As they had said 'no State shall emit bills
of credit, pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts,' imitating their example and im-
itating it to the letter, I prepared the provision of the first see-
tion of the fourteenth amendment as it stands .... "
251. Id. at 18. To illustrate this principle further, he noted that:
The Constitution prohibited the States from passing any law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts. This did not give to Congress power to provide laws for the
general enforcement of contracts; nor power to invest the courts of the United
States with jurisdiction over contracts, so as to enable parties to sue upon them
in those courts. It did, however, give the power to provide remedies by which the
impairment of contracts by State legislation might be countenanced and cor-
rected: and this power was exercised [under section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
17891.
Id. at 12.
252. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
253. GLOBE, supra note 204, at app. 84 (citation omitted).
254. Id.
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According to Bingham, then, the fourteenth amendment was derived
in part from article I, section 10 of the Constitution.
Bingham did not correctly "imitate" article I, section 10 and ob-
viously misunderstood the constitutional principles he was endeavor-
ing to apply, as well as the Court's holding in Barron. What
Bingham bequeathed to the nation was not the sense of the Con-
stitution but his own inimitable confusion. In light of these con-
siderations, it behooves both Congress and the courts to confine the
enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments to the
general framework of the Constitution or more specifically the basic
principles of federalism and separation of powers. We have no in-
dication that the framers of these amendments intended to over-
throw these principles, even though their choice of wording clearly
invites such an interpretation.
Upon reflection, one must conclude that the theory of Congres-
sional power enunciated by Garfield is directly contrary to that an-
nounced by the Court in Katzenbach I and II. If Garfield's interpre-
tation is correct, then the Supreme Court has improperly expanded
the scope of the enforcement power far beyond proper limits. Ac-
cording to Harris,
Garfield's speech on the Ku Klux Klan Bill is most persuasive.
He had supported the Civil Rights and Freedmen's Bureau bills
and the proposal for the Fourteenth Amendment in the Thirty-
Ninth Congress. He displayed, as did many other supporters of
these proposals, a solicitude for preserving federalism in its
essential features. His interpretation of the first and fifth sec-
tions is the only interpretation that is compatible with the
maintenance of federalism and simultaneously gives meaning to
the equal protection clause and the fifth section vesting power
in Congress to enforce the Amendment."'
A number of Justices, particularly Brennan, have borrowed liberally
from Harris' work and cited him often. That these Justices have ig-
nored Garfield's key speech in particular and the debates on the Ku
Klux Klan Act in general indicates a continuing lack of interest
among the Justices in seeking out the original intent of the framers
regarding the enforcement power of Congress. That these Justices
have chosen to ignore Harris' contribution, while at the same time
lifting neighboring conclusions from Harris' work-in one instance
255. R. HARRIS, supra note 202, at 53. It should be noted, however, that Harris' in-
terpretation of Garfield's address is partly incorrect in that he assumes Garfield and
the Forty-second Congress accepted in principle the right of Congress to legislate
against wholly private offenses of one person against another. Id. at 48,56.
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from the same page where Harris evaluates Garfield's speech -raises
the presumption that they would not defer to that intent even if it
was presented to the court.""
CONCLUSION
"[A) Senator rising to attack the constitutionality of the so-called
Voting Rights Act finds himself in a veritable quandary. He does not
know where to begin."' These words of Senator Herman Talmadge
(D.-Ga.), in Senate debate more than fifteen years ago, reflect the
general frustration of Congressional opponents of the Act when they
confronted legislation which presented seemingly interminable con-
stitutional violations. Since that time, the Supreme Court has added
its own perceptible imprint, thereby compounding the problem of
constitutional analysis. Resisting the temptation to examine every
ostensible constitutional flaw and judicial embellishment, this essay
has attempted merely to identify some of the more salient issues,
principally within the context of legislative intent.
The basic argument against the Voting Rights Act, as originally
enacted and presently interpreted, is that it departs frequently and
substantially from established principles of federalism and separa-
tion of powers. This argument is essentially consistent with the posi-
tion taken by Senator Sam Ervin (D.-N.C.), who led the Congres-
sional attack against the Act when it was first proposed. The "over-
riding defect" of the bill, he charged, was "that it degrades certain
States and subdivisions to the point where they are denied fun-
damental rights. . . .'"u Ervin enumerated six major objections to
the bill to demonstrate this proposition -and then proceeded to ex-
pound on countless other evils contained in the legislation. Arguing
primarily from general principles rather than specific constitutional
provisions, Ervin contended that the bill (1) was repugnant to the
constitutional principle that the United States is a union of states
with equal power and dignity, (2) improperly suspended literacy
tests and sought to compel the designated states to change their
electoral laws, (3) prostituted the juridical process by denying the
states access to local federal courts and subjecting them to specially
created rules of evidence and procedure, in contravention of due
256. In his oral argument before the Supreme Court in Katzenbach II, the embattled
Alfred Avins, who also appeared as counsel in the Mayer case, declared that "it would
be necessary for the Department of Justice to burn the Congressional Globe debates if
they were to convince anybody that the original understanding was in accordance with
this statute." Avins, supra note 178, at 381 n.249.
257. II B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1567.
258. Id. at"1557.
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process, and (4) conferred "arbitrary and tyrannical power upon the
Attorney General of the United States," thereby promoting rule of
men and not of law."9 Further, Ervin argued that the law was un-
necessary because federal statutes already on the books were suffi-
cient to secure registration and the right to vote. Turning finally to
a specific prohibition in the Constitution, the Senator from North
Carolina asserted that the Act punished certain states without a
judicial trial, and was therefore a bill of attainder within the mean-
ing of article I, section 9 of the Constitution. That the Act sought to
punish states on the basis of past events also rendered it an ex post
facto law.
Such was the warp and woof of the argument advanced against
the Voting Rights Act by the Southern delegation."' In the days of
Henry St. George Tucker, Alexander H. Stephens, and John C. Cal-
houn, when Southerners distinguished themselves as constitutional
scholars, a better case might have been made. But Ervin stood
almost alone; and although his constitutional critique was percep-
tive, it overlooked obvious defects and emphasized dubious points of
law. Surprisingly, none of the Congressional opponents challenged
the Act as an improper exercise of the enforcement power or con-
tended that it was inconsistent with the original intent of those who
drafted the Reconstruction Amendments. Particularly distracting
was Senator Ervin's futile attempt to confer due process rights on
the states, and his drumming insistence that the Act constituted a
bill of attainder. This untenable theory, relied upon by other con-
gressional opponents, was even repeated by counsel when they ap-
peared before the Supreme Court, and it was not laid to rest until
259. ld. at 1558-59.
260. Only a handful of senators and congressmen, all from the South, opposed that
Act, and it passed both houses of Congress by overwhelming majorities: 79-18 in the
Senate and 328-74 in the House. Senator Ervin was the only member of Congress who
presented a case against the Act based on constitutional analysis. Senator Talmadge
inveighed against the Act as an "immoral and vicious bill drawn for the punishment of
carefully selected sovereign States." Id. at 1550. Senator A. Willis Robertson (D.-Va.)
complained that the Voting Rights Act was reminiscent of "the time when Congress
declared Virginia, the mother of States, to be incapable of self-government, and we
were named Federal District No. 1, and Federal officials and carpetbaggers took
charge of our States." Id. at 1543. In 1975, Senator James Allen (D.-Ala.) broadened
Ervin's constitutional attack against the Act, arguing that it also violated the
Guarantee Clause of article IV, section 4, that every state have a republican form of
government, the ninth and tenth amendments, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause on
the ground that the Act made it impossible for each state to give full faith and credit
to the acts of other states. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 32-37. Altogether,
congressional opponents have alleged that more than ten principles or provisions of
the Constitution are violated under the Act.
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Chief Justice Warren dismissed it out of hand in South'Carolina v.
Katzenbach."'
Confronted by discriminatory legislation which subverted the in-
herent electoral powers of seven states, congressional opponents of
the Voting Rights Act were seemingly at a loss for a constitutional
argument. That a Congressional majority, backed by the President,
would be so imperious as to single out a handful of states for
repressive legislation was an outrage for which these opponents
were unprepared; for not since the darkest hours of Radical
Reconstruction had the South been subjected to such an arbitrary
exercise of federal power. In vain, the opponents of the Act anxiously
searched the Constitution for a clause that would protect their
rights and interests. They cited sections of article I and article II for
the proposition "that the States have the power to prescribe qualifi-
cations for voting," ' but could find nothing prohibiting discrimina-
tory treatment of the states. The founding fathers, though mindful
of sectional conflict and interstate rivalries, were reasonably
satisfied that the system of representation established under the
Constitution, which included equality in the Senate, was sufficient to
prevent or at least discourage the sustained despotism of any single-
minded faction, and accordingly wrote no explicit guarantee of
equality among the states into the Constitution; nor had the framers
of the Reconstruction Amendments granted any future protection to
the states in anticipation of a recurrence of the abuses that the
states of the Confederacy experienced under the Radical Republi-
cans. Groping for a constitutional peg on which to hang their plea,
the opponents of the Act rallied around the Bill of Attainder Clause
apparently more out of desperation than certainty of their position.
If the Bill of Attainder Clause protected individuals against punish-
ment without a trial, why shouldn't it also protect the states?
261. 383 U.S. at 324. The Bill of Attainder Clause, noted Warren, protects in-
dividuals and groups, not states. Alexander Bickel thought. Ervin's argument was
"weird." Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, SUP. CT. REv. 87 (1966). Much of Ervin's
presentation, it has been said, "was amazingly weak from a constitutional view...
thus, his consistent attacks on the bill as an ex post facto law and bill of attainder
would scarcely be made even by a law school neophyte-so contrary is it to all the law
on the subject." II B. SCHWARTZ, 8upra note 27, at 1470.
262. In a colloquy on the Senate floor, Senators Ervin and Talmadge referred to
section 2 of article I and the seventeenth amendment which provide that the states
shall determine the qualifications of those who vote in elections for members of Con-
gress, and article II, which states that presidential and vice presidential electors shall
be selected in such a manner as the legislatures of the states shall direct. Id. at 1568.
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Though never developed in their bill of particulars, a more per-
suasive argument might have been made had the opponents of the
Act rested their case on the doctrine of equal footing. Since 1796,
when Tennessee was admitted to the Union as the third new state,
admission acts have uniformly declared that the state in question
shall be admitted "on an equal footing with the original States." In-
deed, "every new State," as a general rule, "is entitled to exercise
all the powers of government which belong to the original States of
the Union."2 This principle is so firmly established in American
constitutional law that it has long ceased to be debatable." '
"Again and again, in adjudicating the rights and duties of States
admitted after 1789," notes Corwin, "the Supreme Court has refer-
red to the condition of equality as if it were an inherent attribute
of the Federal Union." ' Thus in Coyle v. Smith,""6 the leading case
on the subject, the Court invalidated a restriction that Congress had
imposed upon Oklahoma as a condition of the state's admission to
the Union. Insisting that Oklahoma should locate its capital in
Guthrie, Congress required in its enabling act that the new state ir-
revocably agree not move the capital to a new location before 1913.
The people of Oklahoma ratified this agreement and Oklahoma was
admitted to the Union; but in 1910 they promptly initiated a bill,
which the voters approved, providing that the capital should be
moved to Oklahoma City. In sustaining the right of a state to place
its capital where it chooses, the Court enunciated the principle of
state equality, declaring that the admission power of Congress is
limited by the principle of equal sovereignty among the states. The
power of Congress in question, said the Court,
is to admit "new States into this Union." "This Union" was and
263. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION 844 (1973).
264. Disdainful of the notion that the new Western states should enjoy the rights
and prerogatives of those already established, a majority, of the states at the Constitu-
tional Convention voted to delete the requirement of equality. See II M. FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 454-55 (1937). Earlier, however, Georgia
and Virginia had ceded vast territories to the national government on the condition
that new states formed from such lands be admitted as equal partners in the Union.
This principle was extended to states created out of territory purchased from a foreign
government with the admission of Louisiana in 1812. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212. 221 (1845).
265. E. CORWIN, supra note 262, at 843. Said the Court in Escanaba Co. v. Chicago,
107 U.S. 678. 689 (1883): "Equality of constitutional right and power is the condition of
all the States of the Union. old and new."
266. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
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is a union of States equal in power, dignity, and authority, each
competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution itself. To maintain
otherwise would be to say that the Union, through the power of
Congress to admit new States, might come to be a union of
States unequal in power. . ..",
Thus the power of Congress to admit new states into the Union
under article IV, section 3 is limited not only by the requirement
that the new state not be formed within the jurisdiction of another
state, or by joining two or more states or parts thereof, without the
consent of the state legislatures involved, but also by the unwritten
principle inherent in the federal system of the constitutional equality
of the states. Without this equality, the Union is reduced to a uni-
tary state, held together by force rather than mutual consent, with
the stronger, more populous states suppressing the weaker. "[Tihe
constitutional equality of the States is essential to the harmonious
operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.
When that equality disappears we may remain a free people, but the
Union will not be the Union of the Constitution."'
Opponents of the Voting Rights Act finally put together a case
against the Act using the equal footing doctrine when South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach was litigated, but the Court summarily dismissed
the argument, asserting that it "applies only to the terms upon
which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for
local evils which have subsequently appeared.""' The issue has not
been raised in subsequent decisions under the Act. While the hold-
ing in Coyle v. Smith was limited to the question of whether Con-
gress had the authority to impose unequal conditions upon a state at
the time of admission, a careful reading of the opinion suggests that
the theory of federalism upon which the Court based its decision ex-
tends not merely to the states' rights to constitutional equality at the
time of entry into the Union, but forever. If equality is required for
admission, then a fortiori equality is required after admission, at the
more meaningful period of full membership in the family of states.
To be sure, the doctrine of equal footing is meaningless if Congress,
having once admitted a state into the Union on the basis of equality,
is thereafter free to deny that equality after the state has become a
permanent member. The Court's position in South Carolina v. Kat-
267. Id. at 567.
268. Ld. at 580.
269. 383 U.S. at 328-29 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)).
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zenbach leads to the peculiar result that a state has a stronger claim
to equal rights when it is a territory seeking admission as a state
than when it has already acquired statehood. Reason dictates that
Congress has no greater authority today to strip an individual state
of its electoral powers than it does to compel Oklahoma to move its
capital back to Guthrie.
The South's constitutional claim of the right of the states to
secede from the Union was finally answered by the Supreme Court
in the landmark decision of Texas v. White."" In that case, the Court
rejected the doctrine of secession, holding that the State of Texas
never left the Union. "[T]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks
to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States."'
Thus the theory of the nature of the Union adopted by the Court in
the Coyle and White cases is incompatible with the position taken
by the Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, for if the states are
equal at the time of admission, and thereafter acquire the attribute
of "indestructibility" in an "indestructible Union," they are
necessarily equal in all respects under the Constitution. The power
to discriminate against a state or group of states is the power to
destroy-to destroy that which is supposedly "indestructible." The
argument for the constitutional equality among the states is thus
not only an argument for states' rights but also for the preservation
of the Union.
This serious, if not fatal, flaw might be corrected, of course, if
sections 4 and 5 of the Act were to be extended to all the states.
Corrective amendments to this effect have been under consideration
since the Act was drafted, and will surely reappear in the Ninety-
seventh Congress now that the question of whether to re-extend the
Act is once again on the legislative agenda. While the extension of
coverage to all the states would cure one constitutional defect, it
would surely open the door to new problems. From an administra-
tive standpoint, it would place an onerous burden on the Justice
Department, which is already at the breaking point in overseeing
compliance and processing applications under section 5. Moreover,
such a sweeping extension would bring about a radical transforma-
tion of American politics throughout the nation, spreading the City
of Rome doctrine and the right of minority groups to hold office to
the four corners of the continent. Full extension of the Act would
pose a grave threat to American democracy and the system of ma-
270. 74 U.S. (7 Wall') 700 (1869).
271. Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
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jority rule as we know it, by laying the foundation for proportional
representation of racial and ethnic minorities, with all its attendant
dangers in terms of political disruption, racial confrontation, and
polarization of interests. That the "melting pot" substructure of the
American political tradition has already been dangerously weakened
by current public policies encouraging racial and ethnic separatism
is a factor that should be carefully weighed in any reconsideration of
the Act's coverage formula."' At bottom, the Voting Rights Act
rests upon the presumption that the targeted states and their politi-
cal subdivisions are perpetually discriminating against voters, a pre-
sumption that no longer has much validity. These states, as Senator
James Allen pointed out in 1975, "have long since met and exceeded
fifty percent voter registration and participation standards set out
in section 4." They have not administered a literacy test in more
than 15 years.
Barring repeal of the Act, numerous improvements might be
made to alleviate its more deleterious constitutional consequences
and discriminatory features. These improvements would include (1)
outright repeal of sections 4 and 5, or at the very least modifications
thereof to allow states or their political subdivisions to "bailout" as
an incentive or reward; (2) transferring the burden of proof to the
federal government; (3) revision of the coverage formula in recogni-
tion of the fact that voter participation and voter discrimination are
not invariably interrelated;"' (4) elimination of the "effects" test; (5)
exemption of political subdivisions such as those of north Georgia
where racial minorities constitute a small fraction of the population;P
272. In the Ninety-seventh Congress, 1st Session, Senator S.I. Hayakawa (R.-Calif.)
and Representative Robert McClosky (R.-Calif.) have introduced S. 53 and H.R. 1407 to
repeal the prohibitions against voting qualifications, tests and devices for language
minorities, and the requirement that states and their political subdivisions make
available registration and voting materials and voting assistance in languages other
than
. 
English. See n.33, supra.
273. 1975 Senate Heaings, supra note 32, at 27.
274. Despite the increase in primaries and easing of voter registration re-
quirements, presidential elections in the 1970's revealed increasing apathy among the
voters. In 1972 participation of the voting age population in presidential elections fell
from 60.6 percent in 1968 to 55.6 percent, and dropped again in 1974. See K. PHILLIPS
& P. BLACKMAN, ELECTORAL REFORM AND VOTER PARTICIPATION (1975). In the 1980
Presidential election, only 51 percent of the voting age population cast a vote. Bureau
of the Census, Voting and Registration in Election of November, 1980, Advance Report
(1981).
275.. One attorney in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department has sug-
gested "that political subdivisions which have a relatively small racial minority,
perhaps below five or ten percent ... [should] be exempt from compliance with section
5." This change is appropriate because "the reasonable expectancy of fifteenth amend-
ment violations is very slight where the minority group constitutes such a small percent-
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and (6) the repeal of the congressional regulation on the jurisdiction
of lower federal courts which grants exclusive jurisdiction to the
District Court in the District of Columbia. Also worthy of considera-
tion is the formulation of federal standards of literacy, which the
states might adopt at their option. While changes such as these
would not satisfy many constitutional objections to the Act, they
might have the salutary effect of eliminating its more egregious and
discriminatory provisions.
Frequently hailed as "the most successful piece of civil rights
legislation ever enacted,""" the Voting Rights Act has also been can-
didly acknowledged to be "the most drastic civil rights statute ever
enacted by Congress, going even beyond the far-reaching provisions
of the Force Act of 1871, upon which it is in certain respects, model-
ed."" With only scattered protests, the Act has repeatedly received
the blessings of Congress, the courts, and the offices of four Presi-
dents. During the past fifteen years the Act has enjoyed such im-
mense support as to be practically immune from searching analysis;
and surprisingly few constitutional critics have surfaced to challenge
the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of its provisions. Ex-
cept for the lonely dissents of Mr. Justice Black,"8 no member of the
Court has contended that any section of the Act is unconstitutional.
That the Voting Rights Act, one of the most far-reaching civil rights
statutes ever enacted by Congress, has provoked so little controversy
or constitutional debate in the literature of the law is a telling com-
mentary on the influence of result-oriented jurisprudence and the
concomitant decline of federalism and separation of powers. As a
cross-current in the unremitting flow of praise, this essay subscribes
to the minority view expressed by Senator Sam Ervin that the Vot-
ing Rights Act "is utterly repugnant to the basic principles upon
which our system of justice rests.""'
age of the total population." Important to the Justice Department is the need for "balance
.. . between this possibility and the onerous burden of compiling the multitude of
documents, maps and census information which section 5 places on covered jurisdic-
tions." Roman, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Formulation of an Eztraor.
dinary Federal Remedy, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 132 (1972).
276. Nicholas Katzenbach, cited in 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 121.
President Lyndon Johnson praised the Act as "one of the most monumental laws in
the entire history of American freedom." 111 CONG. REC. 19649 (1965).
277. 11 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1469. At least one high-ranking official of the
Justice Department has conceded that "[sjection 5 represents a substantial departure .
. . from ordinary concepts of our federal system." Stanley Pottinger (Assistant At-
torney General, Civil Rights Division), cited in 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at
536.
278. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections. 393 U.S. at 595 (1969); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 355 (1966).
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